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## Institutional analysis

### *Introduction*

WP1 provided a detailed analysis of the political institutions and the relevant public policies that impact the integration and the well-being of workers in precarious situations and the unemployed in each city covered by the Younex project. In particular, researchers paid extensive attention to policies and institutions that are related to sub-national governance by gathering information concerning 30 main indicators in order to accomplish a systematic cross-national comparison (see WP1 integrated report). For each of the six national cases, the treatment of data was introduced with a “national scenario,” consisting of five main components. After a brief account to justify the choice of the city, the first component dealt with the “political context.” Teams provided information on the political and party system at the national and sub-national levels, including a) an analysis of the balance of power in the executive and legislative branches and b) the analysis of majoritarian vs. proportional electoral systems. The second component focused on the “model of the welfare state in relation to unemployment”; in this case, treatment drew upon the same theoretical background with the aim of identifying the model that is the best fit for each case. The third component dealt with a “model of industrial relations.” In this case, teams looked at balances between different types of conflict management across work and capital in their own cities, taking into account the most recent changes and argument used in debates. The fourth component focused on “youth unemployment politics,” accounting for various features, such as regional and local diversity and diffusion across age categories, ethnicity, gender, and disabilities. Teams also provided extensive information on main responsibilities (state-centered vs. co-managed with social partners). Finally, the fifth component focused on the “role of the family” vis-à-vis young unemployed people, thus tackling questions related to dependence vs. autonomy. In this case, the analysis also dealt with diachronic changes regarding young people living with their parents.

Following a presentation of the national scenario, a detailed discussion among each team’s members regarding institutions and policies enabled them to assess the impact of the political context on the political integration and well-being of workers in precarious positions and unemployed people. In particular, teams evaluated five main dimensions of this political context, translating them into a systematic series of indicators that were appraised along the continuum between +1 and -1. The five dimensions are 1) the unemployment regulations, 2) the labor market regulations, 3) the general political opportunity structure, 4) the specific opportunity structure for the unemployed, and 5) the context of related issues. In particular, the first dimension referred to the *continuum* between inclusion and exclusion (with +1 being inclusion and -1 indicating exclusion). The second dimension referred to the *continuum* between flexibility and rigidity (with +1 being flexibility and -1 indicating rigidity). The third, fourth, and fifth dimensions referred to the *continuum* between open and closed in terms of the general political context, the specific political context, and other relevant issues respectively (with +1 being an open context and -1 being a closed context).

Although the foundation of the analysis was the city level, teams also gathered systematic information at other levels when they were relevant levels for policy-making. Each indicator that was assessed with a quantitative score (+1/0/-1) was referred to the level of specific cities, or otherwise at a supra-city level (most of them at the national level). Regarding a qualitative analysis, information was systematically collected both at the city and any other relevant supra-city levels every time there were relevant differences to be emphasized vis-à-vis the city level. That is, the teams of the Younex project acknowledged the existence of a multi-level exogenous political context that is grounded on city and sub-city bases, even if the overall quantitative analysis has been based, as a rule, on city scores. In so doing, the researchers assumed that the unemployed are impacted politically in a broader context made up of (first of all) local influences, as well as impacts being exercised from

successively higher levels. Regarding the time frame, data was coded for 2008 or, alternatively, for the most recent year in which information was available. When relevant, analysis also dealt with diachronic patterns of change.

There were two steps in the analysis: 1) collecting information to describe each city across the selected indicators and 2) standardizing information along the continuum (-1 to +1) for comparative purposes. The first step was qualitative, providing a strong basis on which the second quantitative step was grounded. In particular, the qualitative treatment focused on the production of detailed commentaries for each indicator. This qualitative information enabled teams to translate indicators into an interval measure along the 3-point scales -1/0/1. Beside a large volume of “institutional” indicators (usually referring to legislation and public policies), research also included some indicators that target “informal” aspects for each of the five main dimensions of opportunities. The main aim was to unveil the effect of hidden constraints or facilitations that may be operating behind the façade of laws and public decisions. For example, data collected about the number of people who receive sanctions for abusing the benefit system provided teams with an indication of the true application of the formal provisions in their own cities: a strong “force of sanction” in the rhetoric of law may well be counterbalanced by its weak implementation.

### **List of indicators and scoring**

#### *Unemployment regulations*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Information to be found</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
1	Formal pre-requisites for obtaining social provisions  <i>(conditions to obtain insurance compensations)</i>	<i>(-1=FT workers only with long periods of contributions; 0= Inclusive with benefits linked to contributions but open to mothers, students, etc.; +1=Universal with no requirements)</i>
2	Level of coverage  <i>(amount compared to the minimum/average salary + duration)</i>	<i>(-1=little amount and little duration; 0= little amount combined with long duration or vice versa; +1=substantial amount for a long duration)</i>
3	Extension of coverage  <i>(who is insured or compensated)</i>	<i>(-1=insiders workers in a “male breadwinner fashion”; 0= open to outsiders but with restrictions; +1=completely open to non-standardized workers, youth and women returning to the labor market)</i>
4	Shifting to Social Aid  <i>(means-testing and amount)</i>	<i>(-1=uneasy shift, means-tested and poor benefits; 0= combinations means tested/rich amount or universal/poor amount; +1=easy shifting with rich amounts)</i>

5	Role played by private and public employment agencies  <i>(combinations of number of people using these services and duration of their unemployment)</i>	<i>(number/duration/collaboration try to combine the three elements: -1= 0= +1=)</i>
6	“Counter-provisions” and sanctions  <i>(length, intensity)</i>	<i>(-1=strong and long sanctions; 0=combination of strength without length and vice versa; +1= short and light sanctions)</i>
7	People receiving unemployment benefits	Absolute figure + Percentage on the total number of registered unemployed  <i>(-1=less than...; 0=between...; +1=more than...)</i>
8	<i>People receiving sanctions for “abusing” the benefits’ system</i>	<i>Absolute figure + Percentage on the total number of abusing cases</i>  <i>(-1=less than...; 0=between...; +1=more than...)</i>

#### *Labor market regulations*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Information to be found</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
9	Regulations for dismissals  <i>(focusing on combinations of conditions and compensations)</i>	<i>(-1= hard conditions and high compensations; 0= easy conditions and high compensations relative to salary, or alternatively hard conditions and low compensations relative to salary; +1= easy conditions and low compensations relative to salary)</i>
10	Temporary Work	<i>(-1=very limited; 0= some role; +1=well developed)</i>
11	Role of unions in the benefit system	<i>(-1=no role; 0= some co-sharing responsibilities with other actors; +1=extensive responsibilities)</i>
12	Unions protection of workers	<i>(-1=scarce protection for full-time workers; 0= extensive protection of full-time workers; +1=protection all workers, both insiders and outsiders)</i>
13	“Flexible” workers	Absolute figure + Percentage of fixed term contracts on total contracts and by age  <i>(-1=less than...; 0=between...; +1=more than...)</i>

## General POS

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Information to be found</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
14	Referenda at the local level	<i>(-1= no possibility of referendum; 0= only consultative referendum; +1=binding referendum)</i>
15	Number of (consultative or binding) referenda held over the past 5 years  <i>(Local level)</i>	Absolute figure
16	Citizen assemblies	<i>(-1= none; 0= only consultative; +1=powers of decision-making)</i>
17	Degree of state decentralization	Lijphart's score
18	Decentralization at the local level: sub-local public structures with political powers  <i>(District level, neighbourhood level)</i>	<i>(-1= none; 0= limited powers, low budget, only a role of implementation and no role in the definition of local policies; +1=greater powers, specifically in charge of some sectors of public policies (definition and implementation), involvement in the definition of the whole city 's local policies)</i>

## Unemployed-specific opportunity structure

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Information to be found</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
19	Power of city in terms of unemployment policy elaboration and implementation	<i>(-1= all power at the national level; 0= some powers, budget, and role; +1=balance of powers between national and local governments)</i>
20	Local spending for passive and active measures per unemployed	Figure in Euro
21	Public information and support services for the unemployed	<i>(-1=none; 0= little developed; +1=well-developed)</i>
22	Inclusion of organizations of the unemployed in unemployment policies	<i>(-1= no role for unemployed organizations; 0= consultative functions in phase of formulation and/or implementation; +1=clear role of decision-making and/or strong discretion during implementation)</i>

23	Inclusion of other civil society organizations in unemployment policies	<i>(-1= no role for unemployed organizations; 0= consultative functions in phase of formulation and/or implementation; +1=clear role of decision-making and/or strong discretion during implementation)</i>
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*Opportunities: related issue-fields*

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Information to be found</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
24	Adaptation of education offer to the labor market situation	<i>(-1= no adaptation since the early 1990s; 0= some limited ad hoc adaptation; +1=regular adaptations)</i>
25	Public support for elderly services	<i>(-1= none; 0= limited; +1=generous)</i>
26	Public support for young people to live alone <i>(combinations of amounts and addressees)</i>	<i>(-1= none; 0= good financial support addressed to the family, or alternatively low individual financial support; +1=generous individual financial support)</i>
27	Child support <i>(combinations of length and amounts)</i>	<i>(-1= low amounts and time; 0= low amounts with high length and vice versa; +1=high amounts until the end of studies)</i>
28	Externalization of child-care	<i>(-1= incentives for women who stay home with their children; 0= limited signs of externalization; +1=fully developed and financed public child-care)</i>
29	Measures tackling recruitment discrimination of ethnic and geographical forms	<i>(-1= no measures; 0= some limited ad hoc measure based on private business choice; +1=public and extensive interventions to fight against recruitment discrimination)</i>
30	Establishment of measures tackling recruitment discrimination based on disabilities <i>(looking at public work and private business)</i>	<i>(-1=weak or no interventions; 0= some interventions in public and/or private work; +1=stronger interventions applied to both public work and private business)</i>

**Summation of main results**

Findings show that the politics of unemployment, at least as it has been developing in recent years, have created deep national differences in Europe, which only partially match conventional knowledge exhibited in the scholarly literature. In particular, the scoring along the five main dimensions of political opportunities is valuable to identify a number of institutional responses to the problem of unemployment (and more specifically, youth

unemployment) that are somewhat counterintuitive in the context of existing typologies of the welfare state. We show that the way in which unemployment is institutionally considered and regulated deserves the highest attention since ongoing reforms might be at the core of broader dynamics that question the true “identikit” of the welfare state as we still draw it today. Findings are summarized in the following table:

**Table 1: Summary scores for the unemployment regimes in the seven countries**

	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Switzerland	Sweden
Unemployment regulations	.625	-.125	-.500	-.875	.250	.500
Labor market regulation	.000	.200	-.200	.200	.400	.400
General POS	-.400	.200	-.200	-.600	.800	-.600
Unemployed-specific POS	.200	.600	-.800	-.200	.800	.200
Related issue-fields	.860	.430	-.290	-.710	-.140	1.000

Focusing on a cross-national comparison, it is easy to identify the contrasting situations in Italy and Switzerland. On the one hand, Switzerland has a strong “flexicure” orientation that combines generous support for young unemployed people with a flexible labor market that erodes prerogatives of workers. However, this strong “flexicure” orientation is far from the usual portrayal of the Swiss welfare state as a “residual” model. The Swiss unemployed youth can also rely on the traditional abundance of political access points that Switzerland gives to all of its citizens. New legislation on unemployment has been subjected to referendums. The direct democracy, which is the main characteristic of the Swiss political system, gives the populace a powerful instrument through which to influence and take part in the formulation of unemployment policies.

On the other hand, Italy is by far the nation with the least flexible cure for unemployment problems. It has a very marginal acknowledgement of specific needs of the unemployed youth combined with a strong protection of “insiders” within the labor market. It is sufficient to understand that in the past 20 years center-left governments have always used tripartite agreements before drafting important welfare state reforms, whereas the center-right governments have stressed the importance of social dialogue, promoting consultations among social partners. Italy is also a country that grants only limited access points for the bottom-up intervention of its citizenry. In this case, however, findings show a picture that is overall consistent with the usual portrayal of Italy as a type of welfare state that lies somewhere between a continental and a “Southern” model.

Sweden and France have a pattern that is similar to the Swiss model, although both countries have put more emphasis than Switzerland on security through the introduction of more generous benefits for the unemployed. It is also noteworthy that in Sweden and France, the extensive benefits for the unemployed fit the broader generosity of these two countries in a large number of issues that relate to other excluded groups. In France, “flexibility” has the least weight when one compares it with both Switzerland and Sweden. In fact, the French system seems to attempt the most difficult program, to balance the protection of insiders in the labor market with a generally high generosity for the outsiders. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Sweden has built what is often referred to as the most generous general social welfare system. Elements such as child care, schools free of charge, health care, pensions, elder care, social services, and various economic security systems are effectively included in the system. Sweden’s ambition to equalize differences between social classes has enjoyed strong support in the long-standing Swedish social democratic tradition.

Poland stands out for its approach that combines an increasing shrinkage of rights of traditional workers on the one hand and the very low inclusion of the unemployed youth on the other hand. That is, cutting Polish workers’ prerogatives has not been counterbalanced with more benefits for the outsiders in the labor market. Quite surprisingly, Germany seems to align with this trend that is known as “precarious,” though one should note Germany’s less drastic scores when compared with Poland. In other words, the German trend does not fit

with the common idea of a generous welfare state, and it seems rooted in its traditions of a corporatist or “Bismarckian” model *par excellence*.

Germany has extensively reformed its own labor market regulations, putting it in second place in terms of flexibility to Sweden at the time during which our data refer. Nevertheless, it has not matched this process with the parallel introduction of a number of inclusive regulations that target the unemployed youth. Indeed, there are considerable changes going on in Germany owing to the labor market and social policy reforms labeled Hartz-Reform, a series of laws passed in the mid-2000s. While there is much dispute about whether this is a break with the past or a gradual and incremental change of policy orientation following the development of government policies since the early 1980s, the main point of our findings is that “precariousness” may well be the distinct element of policies directed specifically at the youth, as the latter stands out as a relevant component of the overall unemployed constituency. That is, the German approach has dealt with the young who are jobless in much stricter terms than it has treated adults who are jobless, promoting further “precariousness” owing to the stronger familial elements and the educative impetus of its laws and public policies.

## **Conclusion**

To sum up, the Younex teams established through the findings of WP1 that unemployment regulations are highly inclusive in France and Sweden and highly exclusive in Poland and Italy, and that Switzerland and Germany provide an intermediate situation. Labor market regulations are flexible in Switzerland and Sweden and rigid in Italy (with Poland, Germany and France providing an intermediate situation). The general political opportunity structure is highly open in Switzerland, tightly closed in France, Sweden, and Poland (with Italy and German providing an intermediate situation). Specific opportunities for the unemployed are numerous in Switzerland and Germany, scarce in Italy (with France, Sweden and Poland providing an intermediate situation). Opportunities in related fields are numerous in Sweden, France, and Germany and scarce in Switzerland, Italy, and Poland.

Ultimately, it is evident that unemployment should be dealt with at the city level and at the other levels beyond the city (international, national, regional) and that all related issues (unemployment benefits, social aid, labor market regulations, child care, education, etc.) should be taken into account. Findings of WP1 showed that city and national governments have very different ways of dealing with youth unemployment, particularly when one focuses on diverging unemployment and labor market regulations. While this is in part unavoidable, given the peculiarities of each specific city and national context, findings point to the need to coordinate policies across Europe, perhaps in a more effective move towards a European-level approach to youth unemployment. Accordingly, a multi-level European governance should be developed that includes all relevant levels, and the principle of subsidiarity should be fully implemented once the best level of collaboration has been identified. Of course, problems stemming from unemployment are often best solved at the city level. However, a closer collaboration between actors at the city and supra-city levels could yield a more effective approach to the unemployment of youth and improve the responses to their social and political exclusion.



## Organizational survey

### *Introduction*

WP2 studied the organizational networks and activities of associations made up of or for unemployed youth. Civil society organizations are at the core of our research because the social and political inclusion of young people who are unemployed and precarious workers depends, among other factors, on the capacity of civil society actors to include in their activities people at risk of exclusion. In fact, through participation in such organizations, people may develop what has been called “social capital”: the wealth residing in human relationships, in civil society associations where people start generating *habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness*.


Furthermore, international governmental organizations have emphasized the importance of including social capital when speaking and thinking about social cohesion or social exclusion. The World Bank, for instance, argues that a cohesive society is characterized by a dense web of social interactions. Networks of civil society organizations generate social cohesion, embedding citizens in their communities and empowering them via political or social participation. Hence, studying civil society infrastructure allows a more in depth understanding of how inclusive or exclusive a context is with regard to specific subjects, in our case young unemployed and young precarious workers.

There is, however, an additional reason for our focus on civil society organizations in a study about patterns of inclusion/exclusion of young unemployed and young precarious workers. In all countries that are members of this consortium, civil society organizations play a key role in the delivery of social services focused on our targeted groups. Moreover, in some countries like Switzerland where federalism and direct democratic processes empower societal actors, civil society organizations play a relevant role in policy making regarding unemployment or, more generally, social policies. In other countries like Italy, although civil society organizations rarely participate in decision-making, in recent decades there has been an increase in public funding of civil society organizations working on social or welfare topics. Consequently, there has been a shift of responsibility from public actors to private non-profit organizations in the delivery of social services. Thus, if we aim to understand the mechanisms leading to social inclusion/exclusion of young people in European countries, we cannot avoid considering civil society organizations.

To summarize, we can imagine two ways through which civil society organizations can help include people in our cities (see Figure 1). On the one hand, there are organizations that are “inclusive” by fostering citizens’ participation; these organizations provide a range of opportunities for an immediate local engagement of a young person living in the cities included in our research. They organize political campaigns, rallies, protest events, and other actions requiring an active involvement of their constituencies, members, or militants. Moreover, such organizations’ activity targets the different phases of the policy process. Following existing research on civil society, we can call these organizations “*policy oriented*”.

On the other hand, there are organizations that are “inclusive” by virtue of the services they provide. Such services are focused on increasing young people’s skills in order to improve their employability. They galvanize people via training activities, education, internships, and so on. We can call this second type of organization “*service oriented*.”

**Figure 1: Patterns of inclusion used by civil society organizations**



Both types of organizations can play an important role in enhancing the inclusion of people at risk of marginalization. However, they may differ in their structures. Some may facilitate people’s participation in their decision-making processes while others may concentrate decisions in a few hands. Some may prefer vertical relationships as traditional big umbrella organizations do, whereas others may prefer horizontal or less hierarchical forms of relationships with other organizations. In their range of actions, some may focus on direct mobilization of constituencies whereas others will prefer lobbying political institutions. Regarding the types of networks they build, some may produce “bonding” social capital, and others could generate “bridging” social capital. Concerning the breadth of networks, some may focus on local networking while others may create ties with national or supranational organizations. Concerning the way they frame the issues of youth unemployment and precariousness, some may just accept the given situation and try to reform it whereas others may challenge the current organization of labor. The analysis of such potential differences was at the core of the WP2 report that aimed at illustrating the multiple methods civil society organizations deploy to deal with people at risk of social exclusion in the cities under study.

**Mapping organizations**

Following the methodology used by previous researchers on local organizations, we adopted a two-step approach in the general design of the study of local organizations. First, we made an inventory of all associations active in the field of unemployment, youth unemployment, and related welfare sectors. Second, we carried out face-to-face interviews, with leaders of associations who accepted being interviewed (some have now ceased their activities, but they were included in the original mapping, and a few others refused the interview).

To be included in our sample, we required that an organization: (1) not be part of a public agency and not be a branch of the local government (although we included

organizations receiving grants and other types of support from public governing bodies, provided that their official (legal) status was functioning as a civil society actor); (2) not be profit-oriented or have business as a core activity; (3) be visible, that is, have a name and be active and recognized by different sources as active during the period of the research. We included both formal and informal organizations because the range of organizations active in our field is highly diversified. Besides formalized and institutionalized organizations, such as trade unions or religious organizations, there are also rather small and unorganized groups that play or could play a significant role. In fact, some of the literature on civil society organizations stresses that informal organizations are more adequate settings for people to do things jointly than formal ones. Hence, restricting our research to fully formed groups would have resulted in losing important social actors. As a consequence, the absence of a formal statute, of a formal headquarters, or of formalized procedures for decision-making were not considered to be criteria for exclusion.


In sum, we included organizations existing *de facto* even if not formally recognized or legally registered, i.e., organizations and groups organizing or taking part in meetings, rallies, marches, etc. or those publishing and disseminating leaflets and similar documents offline and online.

The mapping phase allowed us to identify associations active in our fields in the different cities. However, we know that we cannot claim to have found *all* associations working on unemployment, youth unemployment, and in related welfare domains. We do believe, however, that those we interviewed provided a quite exhaustive picture of the organizational ecology of unemployment in our cities.

The mapping was carried out by using different sources: (1) interviews with key informants (academics, grassroots activists, local civil servants) of the organizational universe in the targeted areas; (2) document analysis of local authorities and umbrella organizations' leaflets, newsletters, and similar information tools; (3) detailed searches in official organizations' directories found in local governmental offices and on their websites.

At the end of this process, the mapped organizations ranged from 13 in Karlstad to 50 in Turin. They were primarily civil society associations but we also included political parties and trade unions due to their relevant role in politics and policies concerning the topics covered by our study. (Figure 2 gives an overview of the different organizational universes and the number of organizations included in the survey).


**Figure 2: Organizational universes and mapping across selected cities**



The organizational universes of our cities differ not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of degree of heterogeneity. According to our sample criteria and definition, the organizational study could include civil society organizations *strictu sensu* (CSOs) but also social movement organizations (SMOs), religious organizations (ROs), trade unions (TUs) and political parties (PPs). Moreover, we included other organizational types that were important only in certain cities (cooperatives, non-profit service centers, for-profit service centers), which were considered as belonging to the general category “other”.

Our city samples can be compared according to their composition (Figure 3). Some of them are more concentrated among a few actors, others are more heterogeneous and host a wider variety of actors. In the first group is Lyon (60% CSOs and only a few actors amongst TUs and PPs), Geneva (52% private placement agencies, no ROs, no TUs, a few PPs), Kielce (50% CSOs, no SMOs, a few TUs, and a few PPs), Karlstad (54% CSOs and no SMOs, ROs, or TUs). In the second group, there are Cologne and Turin, neither of which has ROs.

**Figure 3: Cross-national comparison of samples' population heterogeneity**



### ***The networks of organizations: some comparative considerations***

The size and homogeneity of organizational universes and samples discussed above are very important once network analysis is carried out. In this section, we will not present the network analysis in detail, something that is done in countries' national reports (see WP2 integrated report), but we will provide an overall picture. We compare the general dimensions of city-specific networks by focusing on two types of networks: those for information and those for joint projects.

Starting with the information network, our results show a vibrant connected organizational reality. In fact, the number of nodes is very high and all the organizations participating in the interview are active in sharing information with other organizations (Table 2). This means that each organization has at least one link with another organization, either within the network of organizations that participated (unemployment) or outside it. Meanwhile, the density and the number of ties suggest that all these networks are quite concentrated, as expected.

Furthermore, our analysis suggests that smaller samples are likely associated to higher density ones (this is the case for Geneva and Karlstad), though this is not always the case (Cologne ranks first in density in spite of its large sample; Lyon ranks last in density in spite of having a small sample). Kielce lies in between as it ranks third in the sample's dimension but first in the density. This is probably due to two elements: sampling was more precise (the number of mentioned actors is slightly higher than those interviewed) and the network is the most centralized. On the other hand, Geneva and Karlstad, with smaller samples, have a higher number of active nodes, which consequently produces a less dense and centralized network.

**Table 2: Cross-national comparison of networks of organizations having meetings or consultations or exchanging information (unemployment and precariousness field)**

City	Interviewed organization	Number of nodes	Number of active nodes (no isolates)	Number of nodes (no pendant)	Density	Number of ties	Normalized degree centrality mean value
Cologne	29	65	65	52	0.1091	454	17.115
Geneva	21	63	63	39	0.0735	287	12.698
Karlstad	13	34	34	19	0.0891	100	14.082
Kielce	26	36	36	28	0.1230	155	20.635
Lyon	21	50	49	26	0.0473	116	3.959
Turin	32	75	75	51	0.0560	311	9.694

The second network we can consider is the one focused on project collaboration. This was expected to be a rather small network, either a clique (all nodes interconnected) or a group with numerous simmelian ties (many interconnected triples). Nonetheless, as our results show (see Table 3), project networks are not built in this narrow way. This may suggest that either all these actors are truly active in their contexts or that those interviewed interpreted our question in a shallow way, leading to a wider network of project collaboration. From a synthetic point of view, these networks are not clearly different from those presented before (Table 2). But once again, a network's size may matter. Big networks such as those in Turin and Cologne stand out because of their low density.

**Table 3: Cross-national comparison of networks of organizations that collaborate on projects (unemployment and precariousness field)**

City	Interviewed organization	Number of nodes	Number of active nodes (no isolates)	Number of nodes (no pendant)	Density	Number of ties	Normalized degree centrality mean value
Cologne	29		51	39	0.0584	149	10.118
Geneva	21	50	50	34	0.0551	135	10.041
Karlstad	13	21	21	8	0.0738	31	10.952
Kielce	26	29	27	22	0.0727	56	6.897
Lyon	21	38	35	17	0.0384	54	6.401
Turin	32	75	72	41	0.0382	212	6.486

In summary, this short overview of network capacities of organizations active in the field of unemployment in our cities provides a vivid image of the important tasks civil society organizations are called to fulfill to implement public policies today as well as their capacities for keeping the young unemployed bound to their urban contexts.

## **Conclusion**

The research developed under WP2 unveiled the multiple ways through which civil society organizations can contribute to keeping the society together in the selected European cities

(Cologne, Geneva, Karlstad, Kielce, Lyon, and Turin). There is much emphasis in civil society studies as well as in research on democracy about the wide range of opportunities that social organizations can offer through their actions and structures to integrate groups, in particular groups of people at risk of exclusion (e.g., minorities, immigrants, unemployed), into wider society. Results obtained in WP2 showed that organizations support integration of unemployed youth and precariously employed workers in two ways: by fostering individuals' engagement and political or public awareness on specific issues like unemployment; and/or by delivering services related to welfare provisions to people in need.

Of course, when analyzing organizational capacities to include people, we need to consider that organizations do not operate in a vacuum. Their work for a better social cohesion is influenced, among other things, by their embedded political-institutional context (including their political cultural tradition) and by the type of relations (networks) they establish with their institutional counterparts or among themselves. However, despite different contextual characteristics among the countries studied, all of them showed comparable relevant roles played by civil society actors in (un)employment policies. In countries with a federal structure and with direct democratic institutions, like Switzerland, civil society organizations intervene not only in the implementation phase but also in the policy-making stage. However, even in countries where civil society actors' access to policy-making is restrained, like Italy, the capacity of organizations to be active in liaison with local powers makes them essential partners for policy change in the field.

In all the countries, we found that civil society organizations are important vehicles that integrate people facing unemployment and precarious work situations because they fill different gaps. They provide services that a poorly developed or scarcely funded welfare state does not or cannot provide or, conversely, as in Sweden, they are almost a component of the public welfare state. In some countries, though, such a strict relationship between public authorities and private organizations in the delivery and implementation of welfare state services is not immune from generating mutual dependence processes that threaten the CSOs' critical skills and autonomy.

Furthermore, civil society organizations interact with local governmental entities (only sporadic attention is given to supranational governmental actors like the European one) to stimulate, via project proposals, policy solutions. We have found, though, that local political authorities are rather selective in their establishment of relations with CSOs and other societal organizations. Municipalities and other local governmental entities tend to prefer older, more established and formalized organizations than younger, more informal – and sometimes even more radical – ones.

Such a selection of partnerships by local authorities has consequences for infra-associational relationships and networks. In fact, our study unveiled the existence of a relevant degree of homophily among civil society organizations: when choosing a partner for cooperation, organizations tend to select those that are similar in size, degree of formalization, and also aims. They look to CSOs or organizations with whom they have already cooperated. And in some cases, like in Cologne and in Turin, this mutually reinforcing process of infra-similar organizations selection and political institutions preferences generates patterns of exclusion. Organizations and local actors that are either new or more critical vis-à-vis local policy-making tend to be more isolated than the rest. In our policy recommendations, in fact, we suggested that both local authorities and CSOs embrace a more open and cross-organizational form of cooperation to make their actions against social exclusion more effective.

On another plane, when we asked organizations about what motivates people to join them, we found a large percentage who stated that membership was primarily due to sharing political ideas or common beliefs. Thus, we concluded that civil society organizations offer concrete opportunities for people to find engagement in their urban settings. By getting people, especially young people, involved in organizational activities, civil society organizations increase people's awareness of their positions and roles in the larger society, but they also foster face-to-face interaction in the classical understanding of social capital.

And both of these effects serve the purpose of abolishing social isolation and social exclusion.

Furthermore, organizations in our European cities are far from the post-modern organizational model based on professional managerial techniques and business oriented activities. On the contrary, they are more focused on local service delivery and local participation opportunities. Even the few organizations that have considerable budgets use a decision-making procedure that is still, at least formally, an open and inclusive one.

However, WP2, has represented just one piece that helps us to understand how societal organizations can succeed in integrating people into the larger society in European cities. Research findings from the survey on young people living in the city (WP3) and the in-depth interviews with a sample of them (WP4) have to be considered as containing crucial complementary information.



## Individual survey

### Introduction

In WP3, an individual survey was conducted with young people (18-34 years old) in three categories in each country: long-term unemployed, those in a precarious employment position, and regularly employed. The intention was to carry out the survey by means of computer-assisted telephone interviews with a random sample of 400 young adults per category and country, and that was basically how it was done. However, in some cases we were forced to give up either the randomness in the selection process or the planned data collection method. These deviations are reported in each country's national report (see WP3 integrated report). There were a total of 7012 respondents, and Table 4 shows the final number in each category and country.

**Table 4: Number of respondents in each category and country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Long-term unemployed</b>	<b>Precarious</b>	<b>Regularly employed</b>
France	405	410	396
Germany	329	411	407
Italy	480	480	484
Poland	396	399	400
Sweden	428	400	399
Switzerland	304	254	320
<b>Total</b>	<b>2342</b>	<b>2354</b>	<b>2406</b>

The questionnaire that was used contains questions about social background, attitudes toward work and unemployment, social and political inclusion/exclusion, and well-being. Some comparative results are briefly presented below and the content is based on national reports from the countries participating in the project.

### Social background

The researchers gathered information about each participant's gender, age, education, country of birth, marital status, partnerships, parenthood, finances, and personal income. They also asked participants whether they were unemployed, benefiting from a social program, and had ever had a paid job. We can conclude by examining answers to these questions that there are major differences among the respondents in different countries, and it is difficult to find similarities. This is, of course, reflected in their attitudes toward work and unemployment and their experiences of social and political exclusion and well-being.

Starting with gender, we can see from Table 5 that there is a significant correlation between labor market status and gender in France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. This was not observed in Poland and Switzerland. These correlations, however, take different forms. The highest percentage of women is found among those in a precarious position in Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, whereas in Germany and Poland they dominate among the regularly employed and in France among the long-term unemployed. An unexpected observation is that the proportion of women is higher among the regularly employed in Germany, Italy, and Poland in comparison to men. This suggests that there was a low response rate among employed men in these countries.

Turning to age, we can also see a significant correlation with labor market status in most countries. The exception is France. Here too, the nature of the correlation differs among countries. The percentage of regularly employed people aged 18-24 years is the

lowest in Sweden, Poland, and Germany. This may suggest that the average age for entering the labor market is higher in these countries than in Switzerland, France, and Italy.

Concerning education, there is also a significant correlation with labor market status in all countries with the exception of France. Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Italy have the highest correlation. These correlations indicate that the less secure the connection to the labor market, the greater the proportion of unskilled young people (those with just a primary/compulsory education), and the more stable the labor market connection, the greater the proportion of highly educated people (those with upper secondary education or higher). However, the level of education varies considerably in these countries. The lowest rate of unskilled people is found in Sweden where 12 percent of the long-term unemployed, 3 percent of the precariously employed, and 2 percent of the regularly employed are unskilled. This may be compared with the long-term unemployed in Germany where the highest level of unskilled people was found (71 percent).

**Table 5: Percentage women, people between 18 and 24 years and unskilled (those with just a primary/compulsory education)**

<b>Gender, age and education level/country</b>	<b>Long-term unemployed</b>	<b>Precarious</b>	<b>Regularly employed</b>
<b>Proportion of women</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.08 *</i> )	49	45	39
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.09 **</i> )	46	53	57
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.08 **</i> )	52	62	59
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.05</i> )	53	52	57
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.10***</i> )	51	61	49
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.07</i> )	49	56	48
<b>Proportion of the younger (18-24 years)</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.02</i> )	33	33	35
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.21 ***</i> )	14	27	9
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.10 **</i> )	60	61	50
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.32 ***</i> )	38	31	6
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.40***</i> )	45	20	4
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.24 ***</i> )	27	47	20
<b>Proportion of unskilled</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.06</i> )	58	61	66
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.44 ***</i> )	71	24	24
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.12 **</i> )	10	12	20
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.21 ***</i> )	23	13	5
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.20***</i> )	12	3	2
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.20 ***</i> )	29	12	15

\*\*\*p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01

Marital status is another background variable related to labor market status regardless of the respondent's country. This may be the background variable that showed the most similarities among all countries. In all cases, the highest level of single young people is found among the long-term unemployed, and this is certainly explained by the fact that the percentage of the youngest people is highest in this group.

The percentage with a foreign background in the three groups also varies among countries. The greatest difference is seen between long-term unemployed in Poland where there are no citizens from other countries and long-term unemployed in Switzerland where about 50 percent are citizens from other countries.

To summarize, when comparing long-term unemployed, precariously employed, and regularly employed young adults in Europe in terms of gender, age, education, country of birth, marital status, partnership, parenthood, finances and personal income, major differences can be observed among people in various countries. These differences have

naturally affected participants' answers to the other questions in the survey and are therefore important to keep in mind when interpreting and explaining the results below. They also indicate that recommendations cannot be general but must be adapted to the context in which they will be implemented. We now turn to young adults' attitudes about work and unemployment.

### **Attitudes about work and unemployment**

This section deals with attitudes about work and unemployment in general as well as attitudes toward work and employment from a gender perspective. The respondents were asked to show to what extent they agreed with various statements about work and unemployment. The results from four of the statements are presented in Table 6 where the figures show the percentages of those who agreed to the statements.

**Table 6: Percentages of those who agreed with different statements regarding work and unemployment**

Statements /Country	Long-term unemployed	Precarious	Regularly employed
<b>Having paid work to go to is very important.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.03$ )	91	90	89
Germany (Cramer's $V=.06$ )	95	93	96
Italy (Cramer's $V=.10$ ***)	90	93	96
Poland (Cramer's $V=.10$ **)	76	82	86
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.27$ ***)	76	93	96
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.05$ )	96	94	96
<b>If I won a large sum of money, I would stop working immediately.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.02$ )	54	54	56
Germany (Cramer's $V=.11$ **)	23	13	20
Italy (Cramer's $V=.10$ ***)	21	18	28
Poland (Cramer's $V=.07$ )	20	18	13
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.14$ ***)	30	17	18
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.13$ **)	24	16	30
<b>Unemployment is one of the worst things that can happen to a person.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.06$ )	53	55	49
Germany (Cramer's $V=.09$ *)	72	62	67
Italy (Cramer's $V=.06$ )	70	72	77
Poland (Cramer's $V=.12$ ***)	59	67	73
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.21$ ***)	74	50	55
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.11$ **)	53	40	47
<b>The most important things that happen in life do not involve work.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.04$ )	50	55	53
Germany (Cramer's $V=.08$ *)	30	38	40
Italy (Cramer's $V=.08$ **)	29	27	20
Poland (Cramer's $V=.02$ )	50	51	49
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.09$ **)	37	46	45
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.08$ )	51	42	51

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \* $p \leq 0.05$

Most young people in Europe seem to have the opinion that having work for which they are paid is very important. Over 90 percent in most categories agreed to this statement.

The exceptions are all categories in Poland and the long-term unemployed in Sweden. In most countries, the regularly employed value work the most. Corresponding to this, there were far fewer who answered that they would stop working immediately if they won a large sum of money. As we see in the table above, the proportion who agreed with this statement varied between 13 and 28 percent except in France where the levels were between 54 and 56 percent.

If we focus on the answers from the group of long-term unemployed, we can conclude that in most countries, 90 percent or more of the unemployed agreed that having a paying job is very important. The exceptions are Poland and Sweden where only about 76 percent agreed to this statement. Italy and Sweden had the greatest number who agreed that being unemployed is one of the worst things that can happen to a person. Only 20 to 24 percent of the unemployed in most of the countries would stop working if they won a large sum of money. Here the exceptions are France and Sweden where 30 and 54 percent, respectively, would do so. In France, Poland, and Switzerland, about half of the respondents said that the most important things that happen in life do not involve work. The figures concerning this statement were much lower in the other countries.

A preliminary interpretation of these results is that paid work is very important for all categories of young people. The long-term unemployed in Germany and Italy are the most work-oriented, followed by those in Sweden and Switzerland, while work orientation is the least widespread among the long-term unemployed in France and Poland.

What is it about a job that is valued so highly? The questionnaire contained a question about the values young people attribute to work. The respondents were asked to value aspects like salary, regular activities, social contacts, status and identity, and personal development. The results show that among the unemployed in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, personal development was the most important aspect of a job. In France, Italy, and Poland, salary was most important.

Participants' attitude toward work and employment from a gender perspective were captured using two sets of questions. In the first, the respondents were asked to use a scale of 0 to 10 to indicate how important they think it is for a woman and a man, respectively, to have a paid job in order to be considered an adult. They were also asked to assess the importance of having a job even if one has children younger than three years old.

Regarding the importance of work as an entrance ticket to adulthood, it is clear from Table 7 that people in all categories ranked its importance higher for men than for women. In almost all countries, the long-term unemployed valued work higher as a criterion for adulthood than those in other categories. Although the patterns above are general, there are also differences among the countries. One is the level of importance. Women working is consistently ranked as more important in France, Italy, and Switzerland than in Germany, Poland, and Sweden. When it comes to men, the importance of work for entering adulthood is highly valued in all countries except Sweden.

In terms of whether it is important for people who have children younger than three years to have a job, people in all categories ranked the importance higher for men than for women. Here, however, the unemployed ranked it lower than the precariously employed and regularly employed.

**Table 7: The importance of having a job for women and men to be considered as adults and the importance of having a job for women and men with children aged under 3 (average based on a scale of 0 to 10)**

<b>Importance of having a job/Country</b>	<b>Long-term unemployed</b>	<b>Precarious</b>	<b>Regularly employed</b>
<b>For women to be considered adults</b>			
France ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	7.2	7.1	7.0
Germany ( $Eta^2=.01$ **)	6.4	5.7	5.8
Italy ( $Eta^2=.01$ **)	7.1	7.1	6.6
Poland ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	5.4	5.6	5.4
Sweden ( $Eta^2=.02$ ***)	5.1	4.3	4.0
Switzerland ( $Eta^2=.03$ ***)	7.1	6.0	6.4
<b>For men to be considered adults</b>			
France ( $Eta^2=.01$ *)	7.9	7.7	7.6
Germany ( $Eta^2=.03$ ***)	8.0	7.0	7.0
Italy ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	7.5	7.6	7.4
Poland ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	6.9	6.9	7.0
Sweden ( $Eta^2=.02$ ***)	5.5	4.6	4.2
Switzerland ( $Eta^2=.04$ ***)	8.0	6.7	7.0
<b>For women with children under 3</b>			
France ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	5.9	6.1	6.0
Germany ( $Eta^2=.08$ ***)	4.4	6.3	6.4
Italy ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	6.6	6.9	6.5
Poland ( $Eta^2=.01$ *)	5.1	5.7	5.5
Sweden ( $Eta^2=.04$ ***)	6.2	7.6	7.7
Switzerland ( $Eta^2=.01$ *)	5.9	6.6	6.4
<b>For men with children under 3</b>			
France ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	7.6	7.8	7.8
Germany ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	7.2	7.2	7.4
Italy ( $Eta^2=.01$ ***)	7.6	8.0	8.1
Poland ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	8.7	8.8	8.8
Sweden ( $Eta^2=.03$ ***)	7.0	8.0	7.7
Switzerland ( $Eta^2=.00$ )	7.8	7.7	7.7

\*\*\* $p \leq .001$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ , \* $p \leq .05$

In the second set of questions about gender, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or not with the following three statements: “A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family”; “Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children” ; and “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” The respondents’ choices were totally disagree, disagree, agree, and totally agree. The table below shows the number of people who agreed or totally agreed with each statement.

Between 49 and 70 percent in all groups in all countries except Sweden agreed with the statement that a woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family. In Sweden, between 14 and 27 percent agreed with this statement. However, most people in all categories believed that men should take as much responsibility as women for their home and children. These results are paradoxical. What are the women supposed to do if they reduce their working hours while their husbands do half the housework?

**Table 8: Percentages of those who agree with different statements regarding the roles of men and women**

Statements /Country	Long-term unemployed	Precarious	Regularly employed
<b>A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.08$ *)	56	55	58
Germany (Cramer's $V=.08$ *)	60	49	51
Italy (Cramer's $V=.20$ ***)	62	70	68
Poland (Cramer's $V=.08$ **)	66	64	59
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.16$ ***)	14	26	27
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.04$ )	54	50	51
<b>Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.06$ )	76	85	88
Germany (Cramer's $V=.09$ **)	90	95	94
Italy (Cramer's $V=.15$ ***)	80	95	91
Poland (Cramer's $V=.08$ *)	96	98	96
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.16$ ***)	95	98	97
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.08$ )	93	93	97
<b>When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.08$ *)	33	25	29
Germany (Cramer's $V=.21$ ***)	25	7	8
Italy (Cramer's $V=.27$ ***)	21	19	33
Poland (Cramer's $V=.12$ ***)	34	27	20
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.19$ ***)	6	2	2
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.15$ ***)	19	10	11

\*\*\* $p \leq .001$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ , \* $p \leq .05$

Looking at the responses concerning work scarcity, we can again conclude that the gender equality concept is not very widespread among young adults in Europe. It appears that a relatively large proportion in most countries think that men have more right than women to the jobs available.

### **Social exclusion**

To examine the concept of social exclusion, we asked questions about social relations, participation in social activities, and experiences with discrimination. Social exclusion was also explored through questions about receiving help from and giving help to different groups as family members, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and neighbors. We also asked whether the respondents had borrowed money from anyone during the past 12 months.

Regarding their number of friends, the respondents were asked: "How many friends do you have – people with whom you feel good and trust to talk about private issues or for help if necessary?" The answer choices were none, 1-2 people, 3-7 people, and more than 7 people. Regarding participation in social activities, we asked one question: "Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?" Here the response options were: much more seldom than most people my age, more seldom than most, about the same, more often than most, much more often than most. Finally, the experience of discrimination, was measured by the question: "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that experiences discrimination in this country?" If the respondents answered yes on this question, they were asked to tell on what grounds they felt

discrimination - if it was because of color, race, or nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, disability or employment status.

In Table 9, we present the percentages of those who reported having fewer than three friends, who take part in social activities much more seldom than most people in their age group, and those who experienced discrimination.

**Table 9: Percentages of those who have fewer than 3 friends (people they feel good with and can trust to talk with about private issues or ask for help if necessary), percentages of those who take part in social activities more seldom than most people in their age group, and percentages of those who have experienced discrimination**

Aspects of social exclusion/Country	Long-term unemployed	Precarious	Regularly employed
<b>Have fewer than 3 friends</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.05</i> )	36	35	36
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.25 ***</i> )	30	8	5
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.19 ***</i> )	39	25	29
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.07</i> )	46	40	44
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.32 ***</i> )	47	8	9
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.12 ***</i> )	20	8	13
<b>Take part in social activities more seldom than most people their age</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.06</i> )	27	24	23
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.25 ***</i> )	60	33	27
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.19 ***</i> )	29	28	30
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.07</i> )	45	47	51
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.25 ***</i> )	62	35	36
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.15 ***</i> )	38	20	22
<b>Have experienced discrimination</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V=.05</i> )	21	23	22
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V=.30 ***</i> )	35	15	7
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V=.04</i> )	9	12	11
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V=.12 ***</i> )	11	7	1
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V=.32 ***</i> )	41	19	9
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V=.33 ***</i> )	40	14	10

\*\*\* $p \leq .001$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ , \* $p \leq .05$

With regard to social relations, it is clear from the figures shown here that there is a significant correlation between this and labor market status in four countries. The exceptions are France and Poland. Both of these countries are characterized by a high percentage of people with a low degree of social contacts in all groups. For the precariously and regularly employed, these countries have the highest proportion. Among the long-term unemployed, Poland and Sweden have the highest share of people with a small social network. We can also see that the lowest number of people with few social contacts among the unemployed is found in Switzerland.

Concerning participation in social activities, we can see the same pattern. There is a significant correlation to labor market status in the same countries mentioned above. Again, this connection is missing in France and Poland. In three of the countries (Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland) there is a large gap between the figures for the long-term unemployed and those in other groups; the long-term unemployed participate in social activities to a much lower extent than those in the other groups. Concentrating on this group, we can conclude that the highest proportion of those who seldom take part in social activities are in Sweden and Germany and the lowest in France and Italy.

With respect to discrimination and labor market status, there is a correlation in Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland that indicates that the weaker the connection to

the labor market, the more likely people are to experience discrimination. If we look at the group of unemployed people, Sweden and Switzerland have the largest proportion of respondents who feel they have experienced discrimination, while the proportion is lowest in Italy and Poland.

With these figures, we can conclude that long-term unemployed young people find themselves in a vulnerable social situation and risk social exclusion.

### ***Political exclusion***

Feelings of political exclusion were probed using some questions and statements about political interest, political efficacy, trust in public institutions, political satisfaction, political participation, and associational involvements. In this section, we will describe the results regarding political interest, political efficacy, trust in the government, and some dimensions of political participation. To find out about political interest, we asked: "How interested would you say you are in politics?" The response options were: not interested at all, not very interested, fairly interested, and very interested. Respondents' opinions concerning political efficacy were captured by their reactions to the statement: "Parties are only interested in our votes, not in our opinions," and we are looking at those who agreed with this. On the subject of trust, we asked the respondents about the extent to which they trusted the government. The level of trust was provided on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represented no trust at all and 10 showed a complete trust.

One can conclude that most young people who participated in the study are not very interested in politics, and in all countries except Switzerland there was a significant correlation between labor market status and political interest. However, this correlation takes different forms in different countries. In France, Italy, and Switzerland, the lack of interest in politics is greatest among the regularly employed while it is the greatest among the long-term unemployed in Germany, Poland, and Sweden. In all countries except Poland, precariously employed young people seem to be most interested in politics.

Regarding the statement about the parties' interest in the electorate, between 18 and 56 percent agreed that the parties are only interested in people's votes and not in their opinions. In all countries, it is the group of precariously employed that most strongly believed that this is true. Even here, a correlation to labor market status can be found in all countries except France and Switzerland.



**Table 10: Percentages of those who are not at all or not very interested in politics and agree that parties are only interested in their votes and not in their opinions and their level of trust in the national government (based on a scale of 0 to 10)**

Dimension of political exclusion/Country	Long-term unemployed	Precarious	Regularly employed
<b>Not interested in politics</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.13 ***)	63	53	67
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.15 ***)	62	44	46
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.18 ***)	58	55	75
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.12 ***)	83	79	71
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.20 ***)	76	54	56
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.06)	58	52	59
<b>Agree that parties are only interested in people's votes and not in their opinions</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.06)	37	47	33
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.09 **)	38	56	54
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.15 ***)	42	45	25
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.08 *)	18	34	30
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.16 ***)	25	46	44
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.08)	42	48	41
<b>Do not trust the national government</b>			
France ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.00)	5.0	5.2	5.3
Germany ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.03 ***)	5.7	5.7	5.7
Italy ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.00)	4.8	4.6	4.6
Poland ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.02 ***)	3.6	4.0	4.3
Sweden ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.12 ***)	4.1	5.8	6.0
Switzerland ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.00)	5.6	5.8	5.9

\*\*\* $p \leq .001$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ , \* $p \leq .05$

With regard to participants' trust in government, there was a correlation with labor market status in Germany, Poland, and Sweden, which shows that the stronger one's connection to the labor market, the more trust he or she has in the government. The lowest degree of trust is found among long-term unemployed in Poland, and the highest degree of trust can be seen among regularly employed in Sweden. These two countries exhibit the largest gap between low and high degrees of trust.

Political exclusion can be seen as a lack of political participation, and finally in this section, we report the results concerning four different aspects of political participation: whether those who were eligible to vote in the last national election did so, whether the respondents signed a petition, participated in a demonstration and/or boycotted certain products during the last twelve months. The results indicate a correlation between labor market status and voter turnout in almost all countries. This suggests a political exclusion of long-unemployed young adults and shows that the regularly employed are more likely to vote. The exception is Switzerland where the level of participation in elections is similar among long-term unemployed and regularly employed people. Here the precariously employed seem to be the most politically included.

**Table 11: Percentages of those who were eligible to vote and participated in the last national election and those who have signed a petition, have taken part in a public demonstration, and/or have boycotted certain products during the last twelve months.**

<b>Dimension of political participation/Country</b>	<b>Long-term unemployed</b>	<b>Precarious</b>	<b>Regularly employed</b>
<b>Participated in last national election</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.07)	79	84	85
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.33 ***)	58	89	88
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.09 **)	79	87	84
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.22 ***)	52	69	77
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.27 ***)	71	88	94
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.10)	49	60	49
<b>Signed a petition</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.01)	39	40	38
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.13 ***)	14	27	20
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.11 ***)	13	23	17
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.07)	2	6	5
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.21 ***)	22	44	44
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.13 ***)	47	62	48
<b>Joined a public demonstration</b>			
France ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.06)	29	24	24
Germany ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.09 **)	14	21	14
Italy ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.05)	29	31	25
Poland ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.04)	0	1	1
Sweden ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.05)	7	10	8
Switzerland ( <i>Eta</i> <sup>2</sup> =.11 **)	18	25	14
<b>Boycotted certain products</b>			
France ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.07)	23	23	17
Germany ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.13 ***)	20	35	26
Italy ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.05)	3	3	2
Poland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.06)	0	2	2
Sweden ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.24 ***)	25	54	44
Switzerland ( <i>Cramer's V</i> =.05 *)	30	35	35

\*\*\*p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01, \*p≤.05

The Swiss pattern is repeated in several countries when it comes to the questions about signing a petition, taking part in a public demonstration, and boycotting certain products for political reasons. One can conclude that the level of political exclusion is highest among the long-term unemployed. However, it is not clear in which group the highest level of political inclusion can be found, among the regularly employed or among the precariously employed.

### **Well-being**

Finally, we wanted to discover the experiences of well-being among the three categories of respondents. Well-being is defined using the following dimensions: experience of happiness, optimism about the future, and experience of good health in general. Respondents' level of happiness was determined through responses to the question: "Taking all things into consideration, how happy would you say you are?" This was measured on a scale of 0 to 10. People's degree of optimism about their future was formulated by analyzing responses to the question: "Are you rather optimistic or pessimistic about your future?" and the response options were very optimistic, quite optimistic, quite pessimistic, or very pessimistic. Answering very or quite optimistic indicates a high level of well-being. The respondents' health in general was captured by using a part of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ),

which is an additive index. In this study, there are twelve statements about strain, self confidence, and the ability to structure one's everyday life. In our version, the values vary from 0 to 36; the higher the score, the higher the person's well-being.

**Table 12: Happiness (average based on a scale of 0 to 10), optimism (percentages of those who are very or quite optimistic about the future) and health (average based on a scale of 0 to 36) among different categories of young adults in different countries**

Dimension of well-being/Country	Long-term unemployed	Precarious	Regularly employed
<b>Happiness</b>			
France ( $Eta^2=.54$ ***)	3.5	4.9	7.8
Germany ( $Eta^2=.17$ ***)	6.0	7.6	7.8
Italy ( $Eta^2=.02$ ***)	6.8	7.4	7.5
Poland ( $Eta^2=.02$ ***)	7.3	7.7	8.0
Sweden ( $Eta^2=.21$ ***)	5.8	7.7	8.0
Switzerland ( $Eta^2=.07$ ***)	7.0	7.9	8.1
<b>Optimism about the future</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.14$ ***)	73	75	87
Germany (Cramer's $V=.11$ ***)	75	87	87
Italy (Cramer's $V=.22$ ***)	69	78	79
Poland (Cramer's $V=.10$ ***)	86	91	95
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.30$ ***)	62	90	94
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.08$ ***)	82	86	89
<b>Experience of generally good health</b>			
France (Cramer's $V=.01$ ***)	26	28	27
Germany (Cramer's $V=.19$ ***)	25	30	30
Italy (Cramer's $V=.08$ **)	25	26	26
Poland (Cramer's $V=.07$ *)	28	30	30
Sweden (Cramer's $V=.30$ ***)	20	29	31
Switzerland (Cramer's $V=.09$ *)	26	27	28

\*\*\* $p \leq .001$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$ , \* $p \leq .05$

Regarding happiness, in Table 12 one can see a clear pattern that occurred in all countries. The stronger one's connection to the labor market, the more likely it is that he or she is happy and vice versa. The differences are particularly significant between the long-term unemployed and members of the other two groups. In the latter case, France differs from the other countries. The group of precariously employed young adults in France is closer to the group of unemployed than to the employed. One may interpret this to mean that having a job is always better for well-being, even if it is just a temporary job, or to be in a precarious situation is better than being among the long-term unemployed. One particular difference between the countries is the level of happiness, especially when it comes to the unemployed. The highest levels of happiness in this group are found in Switzerland and Italy, and the lowest levels are found in Sweden and France.

Concerning the level of optimism about the future, the same pattern applies: The stronger the connection to the labor market, the greater the proportion of those who are optimistic about the future. We can also see that the percentage of optimists within the groups of the precariously employed and the employed are rather similar to those of the long-term unemployed. France is an exception in this respect too. A comparison of the countries shows that the greatest differences are found in the group of long-term unemployed, with the highest level of optimism in Poland and the lowest in Sweden.

With regard to health in general, the pattern noted for previous aspects is repeated here. Sweden stands out with the highest healthy rating in the group of employed and the lowest healthy rate within the group of unemployed.

To summarize, one can see that a similar pattern is dominant in all countries. The stronger the connection to the labor market, the more likely it is that one feels happy and optimistic about the future, and that his or her health is good and vice versa. The differences are particularly large when one compares responses of those in the long-term unemployed group and those in other groups.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, the results of this study can be encapsulated in the following statements:

- Long-term unemployed young adults in Europe are not a homogenous group.
- A paid job is very important for young people in all categories.
- The gender equality concept is not a popular philosophy among young adults when it comes to work and employment.
- Long-term unemployed young adults are in a vulnerable situation and run the risk of social exclusion.
- Long-term unemployed young adults can be described as a politically excluded group.
- Long-term unemployed young adults are likely to experience low levels of well-being.

Although these patterns were found in all countries, there are also differences among them that need to be examined on a country level. When it comes to policy recommendations, they need to be adapted according to the context in which they are going to be implemented.

## **In-depth qualitative analysis**

### ***Introduction***

In WP4, in-depth interviews have been conducted with long-term unemployed youth to get a more detailed account of the social and political exclusion of people of this group based on a qualitative analysis of their individual trajectories. Analyses carried out by all research teams were focused around four key research issues: the way in which the long-term unemployed young people defined the problems associated with unemployment; social exclusion; political exclusion; and strategies to cope with problems arising from being unemployed for a long period.

We adopted a constructivist approach to grounded theory, a systematic, inductive, comparative approach to the research process. The value of this approach is that it gives one the ability to generate a theory but also to embed this theory in a strong empirical basis. In the first step, it is usually the substantive grounded theory, which relates to specific issues. If its application is possible in a wider range of contexts, it can be moved to the conceptual level, which is the way to develop the formal grounded theory.

The coding process, which is an essential part of the analyses, follows these steps:

- *Data microanalysis* allows one to conceptualize and classify collected data.
- *Open coding* leads to fragmentation of data and its further analysis in order to compare its similarities and differences.
- *Axial coding* re-combines data that were divided in earlier stages.
- *Selective coding* is the process of their integrating and improving.

Given the grounded theory methodology followed in this workpackage, which is so specific in terms of conclusions drawn from particular national analysis, a comparative presentation of findings is meaningless. Therefore, we present separate findings for each city (see WP4 integrated report).

### ***Geneva***

Through the analysis of the interviews conducted with long-term unemployed youth, we have taken readers on a journey to show them who these youngsters are and how they live without having a job. We have learned more about employment issues, for instance what employment represents for jobless youth, as well as about the social and the political integration of the young people who are unemployed, their well-being, and the coping strategies they use to face the difficulties they encounter. In this conclusion, we will briefly return to the most important findings from each dimension of the report.

First, it seems important to stress the high value that youngsters attach to work and employment. Contrary to some social and political discourses on young and, more generally, on all unemployed people, those we interviewed prize work and the chance to have a paying job. They wish they could have one as well, for they see it as a means of conforming to dominant norms in society and as a way of contributing their share in society. This finding is important in relation to public policies that address reducing unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular. Understanding that the main problem is not that "*youngsters do not want to work,*" one may avoid some misconceptions about both the problems and the solutions proposed to rectify them.

Moreover, on the question of employment, youngsters are aware that having a job is a means of social integration. Being employed offers them opportunities to have contacts with others, to share a daily structure with a majority of the people, and to have earnings that

enable them to afford going out and having hobbies and leisure time activities. This awareness of the side value of employment increases their willingness to have a job. Nevertheless, after a long unemployment period (a year or more), young people face discouragement. They have the idea that they will never find a job, and there are periods during which it is difficult to comply with the job search requirements set by the government for they believe they have tried everything and that nothing works.

This discouragement affects their psychological well-being as well as presenting financial difficulties. Their self-confidence and the motivation to remain active in their job search are impacted, but more generally their everyday lives are changed. The many refusals of their applications leads them to think that they are worthless. The lack of self-confidence, the feelings of worthlessness and the inactivity can lead to depression. Moreover, the limited amount of money they have to cope with their everyday expenses creates worries and anxiety. Additionally, they have even less money to maintain social activities that could help them to keep a positive morale. Finally, most social images of unemployed people are negative. They are associated with lack of motivation to work, for instance, or with people who are taking advantage of the system. Hence, unemployed youth also have to cope with the idea that unemployment is a personal failure and not a social problem.

Another point worth mentioning in relation to the job search is that young people who are unemployed are followed by an unemployment counselor at the unemployment office. Most young people are happy to receive such a service, and they value the opportunities it offers, but they are sometimes disappointed with the service they receive. In fact, most say that the level of service “depends on the counselor you have” and that one can be either lucky or not. In other words, either the counselor will take time to listen and understand the situation faced by the unemployed youth and help him or her through the allocation of active helpful measures or that the counselor is unable to help. Unemployed youth understand that counselors have to follow too many unemployed people and that the system is rigid, which creates an incapacity to remedy specific situations. Sometimes problems can also be linked to the lack of transparency; young unemployed do not understand why they were refused some services. Globally, the problems the young who are unemployed perceive in the unemployment office are linked to their counselor, which is not surprising since most of their contacts are with him or her. Therefore, it appears that we must address the power of this unemployment counselor and the dependency of the young unemployed on them for support, either through counseling or active measures.

To conclude on a positive note, we stress the importance of social activities, family members, friends, and partners in supporting the long-term unemployed youth through the difficulties they face. The family members can help with the material situation of the youngsters, giving them money, buying food, and helping with everyday expenses to reduce the financial strain they experience. Friends provide more help with morale, offering opportunities to go out, talk to someone, or to maintain social activities. These activities are especially important for they help youngsters go out of their daily routine that includes few activities and think about something other than unemployment. Finally, the partner is there to help with both morale and material issues, sharing the problems of the young unemployed person.

## ***Cologne***

In order to get a deeper understanding of the consequences of long-term unemployment among young people, especially with regard to social and political exclusion, we conducted 20 qualitative interviews with young men and women who experienced long-term unemployment. The first thing that we learned was that not all of the unemployed we talked to were ready for the labor market and currently seeking a job, even though they were

registered as job seekers. Suffering from severe mental health problems (depression and/or addictive disorders), they were currently not employable. For them, unemployment is not the main problem they have to deal with but rather a by-product of a complex system of personal problems. For this reason, we did not include these four cases in the analysis and focused on those who were actually looking for a job or seeking help with a career, such as training or education.

Concerning the question related to unemployment and social exclusion, we found two dimensions in our material that are connected with this process of social exclusion – social isolation and cultural exclusion. The most important factor that has an impact on the decline of social activities resulting in social isolation among the unemployed is their financial situation. They cannot afford social activities, and worries about the financial situation can lead to “cocooning” behavior and social retreat. Hence, the more an unemployed person suffers from financial hardship, the more likely she or he will be to face social isolation. Moreover, one’s friends and acquaintances play an important role because they can compensate for the lack of finances and provide opportunities to engage in social activities. Finally, the social background of the unemployed person has an indirect impact on the likelihood of social isolation. On the one hand there will be more family support that prevents financial hardship. And on the other hand, it influences the estimation of one’s unemployment. The higher the unemployed person’s social background is, the less likely she or he will consider unemployment to be a fate with uncertain outcome and will thus be less likely to worry about the situation and retreat from social life. By cultural exclusion we mean the inability to live according to socially accepted norms and values, and it is strongly interrelated with social isolation. Again, the financial situation plays an important role because financial hardship will hinder the unemployed person’s ability to afford status symbols as well as cultural activities and consumption. Further, we have seen several times that social capital provided through friends and acquaintances can compensate those with poor financial resources, e.g., by lending money, by providing opportunities for social and cultural activities and by providing in-kind support. Friends also influence the experience of stigmatization because of unemployment. They are important in that they give the unemployed recognition for what they are doing, keeping them grounded. Moreover, the attitude of the unemployed towards their financial situation has an influence on their attitudes towards consumption and cultural activities. While identification with the group known as “the poor” leads to an acceptance of one’s cultural exclusion, those who are sure that their financial hardship will last only for a certain time period suffer more from it but usually find ways to participate in things that are important to them, at least some of the time. Apart from that, a non-materialistic attitude can make it easier to cope with not being able to attain consumer goods.

When investigating the question about whether there is a relationship between unemployment and political exclusion, we came to the conclusion that some unemployed people have a “political sense” while others do not. The former brought up political issues during the interview even before we asked them to talk about politics. They saw their own situations in a societal context and reflected on their roles as citizens or, more broadly, as individuals related to the public sphere. This political sense accompanies a participatory definition of politics the respondents brought up. Moreover, the higher our respondents estimated their political efficacy, the more they tended to develop a political sense. On the other hand, people who think they do not have any efficacy at all are quite likely to react with political detachment. In addition, the social background of the unemployed plays an important role. Astonishingly, those whose parents have a low social status and/or are unemployed were more likely to have a political sense. The same was true of those who had a rather unionist political attitude. These two features can be considered as indicators for a certain social milieu. Basically, young unemployed people who come from declining workers’ families exhibit a more pronounced political sense combined with a classical social-democratic understanding of solidarity. In contrast, unemployed people coming from higher social backgrounds had rather liberal and individualistic attitudes. In this context, there are

three intervening conditions that contribute to a political sense. First, the more politicized the social surrounding (i.e., mainly friends) of the unemployed is, the more likely it is that she or he will become political as well. Second, we found that experience of stigmatization has a positive influence on cultivating a political sense. Finally, a negative experience with the labor office has a positive impact as well. The influence of the last two features can be explained by the fact that they may lead to a certain “class consciousness” that politicizes the individuals. However, we are not sure about the impact of unemployment on one’s political sense. And even its consequences are not quite clear. Lacking political sense may lead to political detachment, but whether this detachment is perceived as political exclusion depends on whether it is considered to be a deliberate choice or not. At least from their own point of view, the experience of unemployment only seldom changes one’s attitude towards politics. And if it does, it works in both directions – either one politicizes or one becomes detached from politics. We can neither corroborate that there is a relationship between unemployment and feelings of political exclusion nor prove that there is none.

### ***Turin***

The in-depth interviews conducted with long-term unemployed in Turin and the subsequent analysis presented in this report show that social class indicators, such as cultural, social and economic capital, have an impact on the way young individuals live with unemployment and perhaps explain their lives better than other indicators. In this summary of the main findings of the qualitative material we have collected, we come back to the financial, the time, the self, the social, and the political dimensions of long-term unemployment among youth. Then we return to the coping strategies, and we conclude by highlighting the relationship between unemployment and the process of becoming an adult.

Regarding the financial dimension, we have found in the interviews that young long-term unemployed people in Turin face difficult financial situations, although this varies, depending on their housing situation and their families’ socioeconomic situation. Some face very harsh financial situations due to family poverty that can be related to unemployment affecting other members of the family. Others may rely on the help and the financial support of their family members to reduce their financial hardship, and family members provide housing, food and sometimes money for going out or buying something. Finally, those who live alone and cannot rely on the help of their families have to cope with support from churches and charities. They receive food sometimes from friends but most of the time from welfare organizations supported by the church.

These financial situations that have different degrees of hardship cause social isolation. In fact, the youngsters have a reduced social life for they cannot afford to go out, to pay for the fuel, for the drinks, or for the club entries. They have reduced contacts outside of their households, and even the few contacts they have outside of their homes are often limited to other family members: brothers, sisters, in-laws, and other relatives. We could say that they are at risk of social exclusion or at least of social isolation. They have few contacts outside of the family and have weak networks to whom they can turn for help or to keep them socially active.

Another problem the long-term unemployed youths face is related to time and how to use all the available time they have. The unemployed no longer benefit from the major division of time in contemporary industrial societies, namely the division between working time and free time or time for leisure. Money restrictions limit the opportunities to engage in leisure activities, and the dominant model of work keeps them away from other individuals’ daily structure. Moreover, few interviewees engage in other activities that do not necessarily demand an investment of money, for instance volunteer work or engagement in civil organizations.



Finally, we turn to problems related to their self-image. The financial difficulties, the social isolation, and the lack of activities affect their psychological well-being. In particular their self identity and self-esteem suffer from the lack of a paid job that permits society to define individuals based on paid labor and employment status. This negative image of oneself further separates them from others. Moreover, these youngsters are sometimes ashamed not to be able to comply with dominant norms related to their looks. They cannot afford to buy new clothes and see that as a factor related to discrimination, even sometimes by potential employers. In addition, it is important to note that in relation to this construction of the self, one difficulty is related to the fact that they cannot make plans for the future.

We also presented the coping strategies mobilized to solve the different problems. These three are the most important: family help; charity; and work in the black economy. As we have presented above, family help and charity help long-term unemployed people to solve the financial and material problems they face. But they do not permit someone to solve the unemployment related problems connected with social isolation or inability to find a job. Regarding the fact of having a job in the black economy, it is also mainly helpful with regard to the youngsters' financial situation, although here again the solution is partial for wages are very low in the informal economy. Political engagement and activities do not appear as a way to solve their problems; rather the unemployed have a very limited engagement in politics. In most cases we found that they vote, but they have a rather negative perception of politics and politicians who are perceived as self-interested.

Summing up, we can say that young people who are unemployed in Turin present a relevant degree of social isolation, of anxiety, of the sense of personal inadequacy that affects their lifecycles. More specifically, it slows the process of becoming an adult. The peculiarity of this effect of unemployment in this social cohort (young working class unemployed) consists in its intervention in preventing young people from starting an autonomous life. More than its effects on the extension of their social networks, more than its effects on keeping young people from political mobilization, we would say that unemployment freezes the opportunities of young people to become adults. It confines them for who knows how many years in a limbo of material and psychological dependence on families who are themselves in need and are unable due to scarcity of material, relational and intellectual resources to prospect for a better future.

Unemployment as we met it in Turin is very selective. In fact, it is perhaps the stronger reproducer of social inequalities as it keeps those who are most excluded from the collective and individual goal of social mobility at "the origin," and the very few opportunities it may offer, in terms of lack of time and space constraints, are seized by the most advanced in the social stratosphere, those who need that less.

## **Lyon**

We interviewed twenty young long-term unemployed people between the ages of 18 and 34 in Lyon. To get in touch with these young unemployed people and arrange a meeting, the members of the French team had to visit the 'Pôle-emploi' job centers several times, finding those people willing to be interviewed and their contacts, as the search proceeded through snowballing. Final interviews were most often arranged in a café in a relaxed atmosphere, and only rarely in the home of the person being questioned since some of them were still living with their parents. Recording the conversation posed no problems, while the length of the meetings varied between a minimum time of 30 minutes to a maximum time of two hours. Generally, interviewees replied with great kindness. Concerning gender, the final sample contains interviews with 12 women and 8 men. We specifically focused attention on "the experience of unemployment" as it was lived subjectively by the interviewees, covering activities linked to the search for job opportunities but also the daily lives of the young unemployed, the degree and the forms of their social exclusion, as well as their relationship

with politics. Our main aim was to understand how young unemployed people cope with their situation and try to move forward.

Interviewees offered accounts of their personal circumstances that could give one the impression that there are about as many personal stories as there are respondents. Yet, the way that the unemployment situation is differently experienced can be assessed by relating it to the personal path of the unemployed person, in particular the importance of educational investment that the family has made in sending him or her to school. It was interesting to find out that young graduates who are the first generation in their families to hold degrees have more problems tolerating the situation of unemployment, which they and their family members tend to view as unjust and outrageous as they were expecting a successful outcome following their educational investment. Feelings are less intense for those having cultural assets, social relationships, and information about ways to break out of unemployment. This type of unemployed person tends to view the situation as accidental and temporary. In the case of interviewees descended from the upper classes, unemployment is hardly a traumatizing experience: "Work isn't everything," one interviewee explained.

Our interviews also revealed the existence of a specific type of unemployed person who will look for work "at any price." In particular, women from the lower classes resist exclusion from working life and thus tend to accept almost any kind of job, particularly those often involving living conditions specific to single people, requiring full availability and no family obligations. In this case, the family path stands out as a crucial factor to understand these women, as they demonstrate a fierce energy and willpower to break out of unemployment as soon as possible and at all costs.

Another crucial finding is that economic and social assets offer effective protection against the most debilitating consequences of unemployment. Children of the higher classes frequently discover when they find themselves without a job a powerful protection within their family circle and networks of relations. Even when the lack of a diploma enhances their likelihood of unemployment, they can quickly compensate for the disadvantageous situation attached to the lack of academic qualifications. In particular, they can more easily avoid the stigmatizing labeling that unemployment generally brings to those who come from lower social classes. Thus, it is amongst the group that comes from well-off families that one finds features close to the model of "inverted unemployment" as identified by Dominique Schnapper. In this case, unemployed people make the choice to devote their time to unremunerated activities, such as creative, family or even militant pursuits. They see work as alienating and claim liberation from working and choose to live differently. This type of unemployed person was uncommon in our discussions, and variables such as gender, age, and social affiliation build a strong differentiation in the relation of young people in long-term unemployment. This situation is viewed differently depending on the resources, such as financial means, the capacity to adopt alternative activities, the socialization of individuals, and their integration into the family.

Finally, the stronger the attachment to and identification with work, the more unemployment will weaken the unemployed youth's own identity. The central role of work in identity building is even more apparent in the absence of work. This can be seen in the case of young unemployed people who conduct their job search as though it were a full-time occupation. The rules of competition in the labor market are accepted, and unemployment is considered to be a phase to go through. In this case, the young unemployed persons continue to identify themselves by their occupation or their training. Even without a job, they put their own resources into the service of their prime objective: the return to work.

### ***Karlstad***

Employment is a central prerequisite for social integration, as has long been known. Our need for social contacts, regular activities, a time structure, and participation in achieving

collective aims are fulfilled by employment. Consequently, a loss of employment means more than just losing work and income. Losing a job puts one at risk of being shifted to the edge of society or even ending up completely outside of it.

Social exclusion or isolation may also be called a limited world of experiences. This limitation may be experienced in different spheres of life. Our results show that the problems related to or resulting from unemployment are connected to the very central elements of people's everyday lives: the spheres of the labor market, finances, social contacts, emotions, the rhythm of life, and plans for the future.

The respondents in this study clearly expressed that they thought work was important. Through work one receives a regular income, status, identity, and social networks. Not being able to present oneself as belonging to a certain profession is experienced as shameful and to be avoided if possible. Further, the extent of financial hardship one suffers will also influence the experience of being unemployed. A feeling of inferiority has its origin in the unemployed person's financial situation, which is described as the most injurious result of unemployment:

One can clearly see that people miss having routines, activities, and a social network when they are unemployed. All of our respondents described passivity and not having anything to do as problems they experience. It is harder to maintain a meaningful social identity without work, and one may experience difficulties in finding other meaningful social activities in which to participate.

The experience of unemployment will probably be affected by the degree of emotional support one may get from friends and family, as well as by the kind of social networks one has outside the workplace. Coupled with a loss of social networks, the situation may lead to social isolation, especially in combination with financial difficulties.

Although unemployment rarely leads to a total loss of social contacts or economic resources, limitations in these regards seem to be common. It is quite obvious that unemployment limits the everyday life experiences of those concerned. Any such experience of limitation on its own or in combination with other experiences may lead to a retreat from social life. When needs that are usually met by employment fail to be fulfilled in another way, there is an increased risk of social exclusion.

The interviewees' interest in politics ranged from complete indifference to great involvement. Our interviewees did not directly relate politics to questions concerning everyday life. It is apparent that on the one hand politics are coupled with difficult, abstract questions and on the other hand with politicians, usually male. The respondents were most engaged by different types of questions connected to unemployment, such as what is being done to create jobs as well as the way in which the financial situations of unemployed people are influenced by political measures.

Political participation is an important issue. Even though the respondents have doubts about the influence they have on the political outcomes, the data show that voting is seen as a given, even though the county council elections are of least interest. Through voting the young people see a chance to show what they think. However, our material shows that the participants see local politics as difficult to understand but also to be of less importance. This may be related to the questions that are most interesting to the unemployed and that influence their current situations, questions that are often treated on a national level.

There is no clear link between their political indecisiveness, as far as open list elections and especially the election of political parties are concerned and being unemployed. Instead, the results indicate an absence of a general overview and difficulties with distinguishing the different parties' political mandates from one another, as well as problems with understanding the consequences of these differences. It is important to emphasize that there are no clear indications that the interviewees' political indifference is connected to unemployment. In fact, it may rather be related to their youth. Yet unemployment may be a contributing factor to this feeling.

It is important to note that not all problems experienced by the jobless, especially the long-term unemployed, result from their unemployment, and these particular problems should not be exclusively associated with unemployment. However, these problems may be reinforced by unemployment, and the experience of being unemployed may be influenced by these problems.

It is also important to note that not all unemployed people are to be considered unhappy. There are also positive sides to unemployment; one is free to do what one wants to, one is able to sleep until one wakes up and take life as it comes, and one has the opportunity to pursue occupations that one otherwise would not have time for, like studying. In comparison to a difficult working life, a period of unemployment may be experienced as a relief.

Further, unemployment may affect women and men differently, especially after having children. Mothers do not seem to feel the same pressure to work because they make taking care of the children and the household a priority. On the contrary, men want to provide for the family, so they experience greater pressure to work even when they have children. This may explain why men are affected more adversely by unemployment than women.

Finally, the immigrants with completed academic qualifications who were interviewed did not experience their unemployment in the same way as the Swedish-born respondents. The biggest problems experienced by these interviewees are the Swedish language and integration within the Swedish society. Compared to native Swedes, the everyday life of this group is conditioned in a different way: They are busy expanding their social networks with new friends and acquaintances even during their unemployment, due to a relatively short time in Sweden. Although some of them experienced stressful financial situations that influence their day-to-day lives, they said this was manageable and of a passing nature. This group reflected confidence about the future and regarded unemployment as a temporary phase that will soon pass. However, failing to get a job in the near future will probably influence them negatively.

## ***Kielce***

The qualitative analysis carried out in accordance with the grounded theory methodology leads to the two-axes typology being a combination of “maturity category” with a category of “financial situation.” This typology allows the researcher to not only systematize quite diverse material collected in terms of coping strategies used by interviewees but also to try to answer a question about which of the unemployment situations listed below are connected with the highest risk of social exclusion. Maturity means a place on the adulthood axis which reflects the degree of internal steerability of a person and his/her ability to make rational decisions. The detailed analysis of interview records allowed us to identify three primary categories, which gave us a basis for this axis, namely: selfish vs. quasi-altruistic orientation, the degree of independence (focus on external assistance vs. one’s own resources), and adaptability – paying special attention to such elements as sense of impact on reality, flexibility of expectations, or risk-taking ability as well as actions carried out. Financial situation refers directly to resources of young unemployed people or resources that may be available in connection with support received from relatives / friends or institutions. Participants in this survey differed significantly in this respect. Some of them are experiencing a rather stable situation, which allows them to make different choices (if they decided to take actions) but also gives them the comfort of choosing abandonment or of postponing actions. Interviewees whose situations put them at risk of poverty and social exclusion are at the other end of this axis. The combination of these two dimensions results in the following unemployment situation typology:

- Vulnerable to exclusion (low maturity, worse financial situation)

- Motivated unemployed (high maturity, worse financial situation)
- Adult kids (low maturity, better financial situation)
- Young adults (high maturity, better financial situation)

*Vulnerable to exclusion:* People in this type of unemployment situation gradually “seal-up” into the immediate family as can be inferred from their usual daily routines. They spent most of their time in tiny apartments with their parents who were often outside the labor market themselves (unemployment, pension, retirement), and thus they have lots of free time. On the other hand, the unemployment of the parents additionally hinders the financial capacities of their households, in which the adult children remain financially dependent on them. Although the total income of interviewees is often sufficient to cover basic expenses, such situations shall be treated as a threat of poverty and social exclusion experience. In fact, from their interviews, it is apparent that they remain on the remote outskirts of social life.

*Motivated unemployed:* This is a name for a lifestyle of young people who are only formally considered unemployed. They have been officially unemployed for a minimum of 12 months and have declared they are looking for a job, and they informally earn some money. Young people in this group are distinguished by their substantial activity. On the other hand, they openly declare and highlight their pursuit of financial independence since being dependent on parents makes them uncomfortable. The data provides much more information concerning the relations of the “motivated unemployed” with their friends. There is little evidence of social exclusion here.

*Adult kids:* Those in this group willingly accept being financially dependent on their parents. Independence is not their most important goal even if they would have had a source of income. Their statements concerning a typical daily routine reflect properly their ideas about the importance of social life. Friends are placed in a central position, and the daily routine resembles that of a student on holiday. The interviewees have a high regard for friendship. They trust their friends, with whom they share problems, unemployment being one of them. The group of friends is so significant to “adult kids” that they may influence and in effect modify their work and life plans, causing them, for example, to quit their jobs. The sphere of social life may also be a kind of compensation for failures in other areas of life. It is worth mentioning though that despite their lifestyle, adult kids do not consider themselves to be teenagers. They are aware of the passage of time, and that this means their carelessness (for which they yearn so much) is fading away.

*Young adults:* These are people who started their own families and focus on them while answering questions. Most of the interviewees who could be classified as “young adults” were female, married, and had children. Thus, it is not surprising that their daily routine is focused on performing family duties. Some of their statements showed the constraints their lifestyle puts on relationships with friends and acquaintances. They express attitudes similar to those stated by the “young adults” and the “vulnerable to exclusion”, but their reasons are different. Thus, a kind of deficit in relations with friends and acquaintances shall not be regarded as a symptom of social exclusion but as a temporary marginalization of social contacts on the list of priorities. Although the young unemployed people cannot be treated as excluded from all the closest forms of social life, being dependent on one source of income and remaining outside the labor market for a long time under unfavorable circumstances may lead to social exclusion.

A main focus of the qualitative analysis was mechanisms used to solve or mitigate problems whether or not the interviewee makes conscious or rational decisions. Coping strategies of young unemployed people were analyzed in three areas that the interviewees judged to be the most acute in their circumstances: poor financial situation of the household, the lack of permanent employment and career opportunities, and a sense of boredom or too much free time.

Experiencing financial difficulties was the problem most often indicated by the interviewees as an effect of unemployment. People in this situation complained about the necessity for a more or less drastic reduction in consumption. They are forced to use the

material support of the family, do not participate in costs of household maintenance, do not pay for food, domestic goods, etc. They defined their situation as living off their parents. The financial support from the family was variously assessed by the respondents, however. For some of them (those classified as “adult kids”), family support is a natural situation, not triggering any discomfort. Others (the “motivated unemployed”) felt ashamed of their lack of independence and a declared willingness to participate in costs of maintenance of their family.

Attitudes towards social assistance were ambiguous: some of the unemployed (“vulnerable to exclusion”) regarded taking advantage of social assistance in a neutral way; their narratives were not accompanied by emotions. Others dissociated themselves from the possibility of taking advantage of any institutional support at all because they perceive social assistance as stigmatizing symbolizing life clumsiness of the beneficiary.

Casual work, often illegal, is quite popular among unemployed youth, but it is perceived as a coping strategy and not a way of acquiring vocational experience or improving one’s labor market opportunities. They clearly distinguish the worlds of casual and permanent work. Casual jobs were taken only occasionally by those who assessed the financial situation of their households as good (“young adults”), and they did not feel that doing so would bring them closer to their dream registered work. They said that only permanent employment is “real work.” Another factor that influences the unemployed to take a casual job is readiness to accept risk connected with non-registered work. It is obvious for them that employment without any contract puts a person at risk of being exposed to dishonest behaviors of the employer: non-payment of remuneration or reduction of agreed-upon remuneration rates.

For many respondents, a wide network of social contacts is a condition for coping with the world of casual jobs. There is a double system of references. Friends help to find casual jobs and their opinions help to assess the reliability of a potential employer. On the other hand, good contacts with colleagues are also a condition for enforcing overdue payments from the employer (even using an illegal method to settle accounts with a dishonest employer). Less drastic methods of protection against employers’ dishonesty are taking advance payments and settling accounts on a weekly and not monthly basis.

Trips abroad are a specific form of casual work, however temporary. The interviewees did not plan their careers abroad and rejected the possibility of moving to another country permanently, mainly because of the fear of homesickness. Going abroad without any idea of what to expect raises fears of having no job and problems with settling in a new place. Only a few participants had any experience of working abroad, and they did not exclude another departure abroad in the future.

Another part of the analysis concerns job-seeking activities and strategies to increase labor market opportunities. Interviewees clearly differed concerning the time and efforts invested in a job search. Some had total disbelief in the success of job seeking, which resulted in resignation and withdrawal (“vulnerable to unemployment”) and a satisfaction with having so much free time, as well as low motivation to change one’s situation (“adult kids”). On the other hand, some of the unemployed persist in their efforts to find a job (“motivated unemployed”). This difference in attitudes is particularly visible in people’s chosen job-seeking methods and opinions about them. Some interviewees see the main obstacle as a lack of appropriate contacts; in their opinion, most recruitment processes are carried out only pro forma, and employers have already chosen a candidate before making the job announcement. Others put a lot of effort into searching for job offers on websites or in the press and radio announcements. Few favor visiting employers or calling them to ask about vacant positions as rather ineffective and putting them in inconvenient situation.

One of the coping strategies is reducing demands of potential employment. The “motivated unemployed” are ready to considerably reduce their appetites and accept an offer that does not fully meet their expectations. They are also the most interested in training courses offered by the Labor Office. Others reject an opportunity to participate in such

training courses, mainly because they think the training subject does not fit the vocational profile of a job seeker. They are reluctant to change their profiles and they consider deciding to participate in a course to be a life failure. Many interviewees perceived some problems with finding a job coming from poor educational choices. Returning to secondary school or acquiring higher education are perceived as effective methods to enhance one's value on the labor market. The "motivated unemployed" often decide to further their educations; some of them try to develop their own skills if they cannot afford a higher level of education.

The general aim of the qualitative part of the project was to better understand the situation of the young from Kielce, Poland, who have been unemployed for a long time. The grounded theory methodology allowed the researchers not only to select the core explanatory concept (in this case the notion of "maturity") but also to construct the typology of four significantly different unemployment situations. The set of analytical steps undertaken by the research team appears to have been worth the effort since the constructed typology served as a good starting point for the analysis of the spectrum of solutions considered by the research participants as "available" as well as for the comparisons between participants who were significantly different in terms of age and the level of education they had achieved. In view of the fact that part of the project was also quantitative research on a representative sample, the next step will be confronting the findings and further comparative analysis.

## **Conclusion**

The analysis of the qualitative in-depth interviews conducted according to the grounded theory methodology provided substantial insights into the situations of long-term unemployed young people. It was mainly focused on the impact of unemployment on social and political exclusion and on the ways young people cope with this situation.

The rich and differentiated material gathered in the six countries can hardly be summarized in a few statements. Nevertheless, the following elements are apparent:

- The most important life problems raised by long-term unemployment are due to financial shortages. However, their scope differs.
- Almost all unemployed take advantage of various forms of material help from their families, friends, and acquaintances. Not all beneficiaries easily accept this situation. They experience a psychological conflict because they receive help for a long time and are unable to repay their benefactors.
- Another source of financial support are public institutions of the welfare system. In some countries, substantial support is provided by charitable organizations, many of them connected with the Catholic Church. Some unemployed, however, feel uncomfortable and even ashamed about being dependent on the welfare system and lacking financial autonomy.
- Most of the unemployed actively search for a job, looking for job announcements in newspapers, on the Internet, or in unemployment offices. Those who are more pro-active make phone calls, visit the enterprises (especially the small ones), enroll at temporary job agencies and on-line databases, making spontaneous offers to work in enterprises seeking employees.
- Some participants ask friends and relatives for information about job opportunities in their workplaces, which shows that social capital is helpful in attempts to overcome the unemployment situation. Another form of using social capital is exchanging services with friends and relatives.
- A popular way of coping with financial shortages is taking the opportunity offered by different precarious jobs: temporary, casual, seasonal (often on the grey or black labor market).

- Other coping strategies are: reducing consumption, strictly controlling one's budget, lowering ambitions concerning the type of job one will accept, investing in training (either through the unemployment office or at one's own cost) or acquiring higher education, and going abroad for a job.
- Long-term unemployment has a rather limited and not systematic impact on social exclusion. Some unemployed people experience a reduction of social contacts because they lack money, and this results in a loosening of social networks. On the other hand, especially in some countries, family and friend ties seem to be based much more on cultural and habitual patterns.
- Young unemployed people are very disparate in terms of their interest and participation in politics. In the majority of countries, the interest in politics varies from complete indifference to great involvement. Qualifying this lack of interest in politics as a form of political exclusion may depend on more detailed analyses of its roots and background.



## **EU-level analysis**

### ***Introduction***

The evolution of a European layer of employment policies, especially via the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) launched at the end of the 1990s, has given birth to analytical questions connected to the overall role that European institutions can play in setting an agenda and formulating and adopting innovative policies that could help member states better address common societal challenges. Among these challenges, one of the most striking problems has been the overall diffusion of high unemployment rates among youth throughout Europe, which began in the early eighties. WP5 was designed to monitor the development of youth policies at the EU level and assess the process of policy-making and implementation. The analysis was centered on measures and initiatives related to youth (un)employment, as they are outlined in the European employment initiatives and guidelines. We covered the period from 1997, when the first employment guidelines were established, to the current European Strategy 2020. The purpose of the analysis was to describe and assess the development of youth policies within the Lisbon Strategy and the follow-up Strategy Europe 2020. WP5 aimed at answering several questions. Is youth unemployment considered to be a specific problem awaiting targeted policy measures, and how is it defined? What are the specific objectives, instruments, and measures adopted? To what extent does the European Employment Strategy promote youth policies at the national level? What role do civil society organizations play in the process?

For these analytical purposes, we gathered empirical data from various sources. In particular, we conducted preliminary talks with experts at the EU and national level; we retrieved and analyzed important policy documents (policy initiatives, reports, written interventions, etc.), and, finally, we conducted a number of interviews from August 2010 to June 2011 with members of different institutions, including national governments, the European Commission and Parliament, NGOs, and social partners (see WP5 report).

### ***Main findings***

The analysis of EU policies in the field of youth unemployment provided insights into the relevant policy agendas, initiatives, and recommendations of European institutions. The main findings are summarized in this section.

#### *Considerable progress has been made in identifying youth unemployment as an important policy target*

One decade ago, youth unemployment was not on the agenda of EU institutions. During the early years of the European Employment Strategy (1997-2000), the issue of youth unemployment was raised only marginally. In fact, while the employment guidelines proposed tackling youth unemployment and preventing long-term unemployment, young people were considered to be part of a group that is generally unemployed and were not seen as a separate group whose problems await specific solutions. Only after the White Paper on Youth had been adopted in 2001 and only after the establishment of the first framework for European co-operation in youth policy by the Council in 2002 were member states encouraged to establish laws, strategies, and action plans regarding youth on the European and national level. In 2005, the Commission pointed out the need to support young people within the Lisbon process for more growth and better jobs, particularly in relation to their access to the labor market. As a consequence, the “European Youth Pact” was adopted by the European Council in 2005. It was meant to provide a political instrument to improve the impact of the revised Lisbon Strategy within the field of youth policies. The member

states were urged to improve education, training, and social inclusion within the framework of the European Employment Strategy and the Social Inclusion Strategy.

These initiatives were intensified as a consequence of the economic crisis of 2008 and the high unemployment rates among young people, and the Commission and the Council of the European Union called for stronger policy action on the European and the national levels. While active citizenship, social inclusion, and solidarity of young people had already been objectives of the framework of European cooperation within various policy areas, education, employment, and social inclusion are now becoming more important. During the review of the Lisbon Strategy and the follow-up EU 2020 Strategy, policy initiatives related to youth have been fully incorporated in various policy areas (e.g., employment, social inclusion, and education and training). Moreover, various flagships have been developed, amongst them the “Agenda for New Skills and Jobs,” which aims to modernize labor markets and empower people to develop their own skills throughout the lifecycle, by increasing labor participation and by better matching labor supply and demand, including labor mobility 2010. Most prominently, we refer to the flagship “Youth on the Move” launched in 2010, which is an ambitious initiative within the ongoing strategy development in the field of youth policies and presents a specific framework for activities in the field of youth employment policies.

*EU initiatives have developed a proactive approach with regard to the transition from education to work, yet, they need to be developed in relation to job and social security*

The Lisbon 2020’s initiatives on youth and employment (i.e., “Youth on the Move” and “New Skills for New Jobs”) are committed to facilitate the transition from education to work by improving qualifications and skills and accelerating the access to the labor market. They promote a more proactive approach by identifying tangible targets and objectives. The “Youth on the Move” flagship, in particular, argues that youth unemployment rates have reached an unacceptable level and that labor market segmentation entails the risk of forcing young people into low-quality and underpaid internships and precarious jobs. It sees the need to take action regarding the improvement of education and training, career counseling and job placement, and the creation of more and better jobs. In particular, it includes specific recommendations, such as the Youth Guarantee, the quality framework for internships or traineeships, better career and vocational-orientation guidance services, and more stable job contracts. EU policy initiatives thus place particular emphasis on education and skills along with mobility and labor market inclusion. Measures against labor market segmentation and precariousness are mentioned but remain vague. Moreover, social security is discussed only marginally. There is a general concern about providing young people with adequate social security coverage, but these statements are rare and remain very general. Moreover, the focus is not on the development and harmonization of social security standards for young people but more precisely on the modernization of social protection systems. The aim is to foster high rates of labor market participation and ensure the sustainability of welfare systems and the stability of public finances. Concerning the EU’s own concept of “flexicurity,” present policies place more emphasis on flexibility than on security.

The flagship initiative “Youth on the Move” is the first European policy framework on youth that identifies general objectives and priorities, key areas of action, and more specific measures as outlined above. Moreover, it integrates several ideas and concepts from previous policy initiatives in an incremental manner, thus guaranteeing some continuity in policy deliberation and decision-making. However, the incremental dynamic is responsible for the bias towards employability and labor market inclusion measures compared to the attention being paid to social rights and benefits. What is still lacking is a more comprehensive and coherent policy strategy to tackle the multidimensional problem of youth unemployment.

*Several processes of European policy coordination have been launched, yet, they do not address employment and youth in an integrated manner*

The field of youth-related policies is nascent and thus rather fragmented. There are two reasons. On the one hand, we have seen that youth policies are a rather new field of activity at the EU level, so policy initiatives are being developed in an incremental and disjointed manner. On the other hand, the European Union lacks regulatory competencies related to the labor market and social policies. For this reason, “soft governance” instruments have been developed to increase the capacity of policy coordination amongst the 27 member states. Here, we can name the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which has been used in various policy fields, the most youth-relevant being the employment, youth, and social inclusion OMCs. Most of these voluntary processes have been well received by member states and have been working for several years. However, these coordination processes are weakly integrated and interrelated. For instance, the youth OMC does not focus explicitly on employment, while the employment OMC has no specific policies related to youth. Due to these separate processes, policy agendas remain fragmented, and a comprehensive strategy to prevent and solve the multidimensional problem of youth unemployment remains underdeveloped. What is needed is a more youth-specific coordination of European policy processes.

*European policy coordination is well accepted, yet, its effectiveness needs to be improved*

The OMC is well received by European institutions and member states, and our interview partners agree that this process has its strengths in the area of comparability and transparency (e.g., via indicators and continuous monitoring), and the exchange of information and experiences (e.g., the peer learning). Accordingly, the OMC seems to have a long-term effect on policy knowledge and political agendas. It helps to influence the direction of policy debates within member states by identifying issues, defining problems, setting targets, and promoting policy ideas and measures.

However, in line with findings from previous research and debates, the OMC is weak in advancing and implementing a more proactive and comprehensive strategy against youth unemployment. The method's effectiveness relies mostly on the potential pressure (i.e., “naming and shaming”) exercised by EU institutions, member states, interest groups, or the media. According to our interview partners, this limits the effectiveness of policy coordination, with the consequence that EU policy initiatives in the field of youth unemployment have little impact on national policy reforms and local practices. Policy actors agree that as long as competencies are not shifted to the EU level, the OMC needs to be applied more consistently and rigorously. In fact, interview partners highlighted that “peer learning” does not seem to work as intended. They emphasize that policy learning is not open but operates within a predefined agenda focusing on specific areas of action (e.g., apprenticeship schemes and modules in order to try to ease transition from school to work), to the detriment of others (e.g., contractual arrangements for young people or access to social systems). Moreover, peer review is used by member states primarily as a method of political marketing, through highlighting their success stories and ignoring their failures and shortcomings. Finally, member states do not examine each other's policies and practices in depth and do not use EU recommendations and guidelines to develop proactively new policies. The potentials of peer and policy learning are thus not fully developed. Few incentives or sanctions are in place to increase learning. A more rigorous and critical process of monitoring, learning, and mutual surveillance should be developed.

*Conflicts of interest hinder the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive European policy on youth unemployment*

Progress has been made in identifying youth unemployment as an important policy issue, and in defining overarching objectives and policy areas. However, conflicts of interest obstruct the further development of a comprehensive strategy on youth unemployment with a

tangible course of action. Even though youth unemployment is by now a high priority issue at the EU level, it is true as well that any specific policy recommendation and initiative unleashes disagreements among those with competing political interests and opinions, including governments, public interest groups, and experts at the European and national levels. On the one hand, conflicts are apparent between member states and are due to the apparent differences between their educational systems, labor markets, social security programs, and financial capabilities. On the other hand, there is disagreement among the social partners (the employers and trade unions) and social NGOs about the necessity to develop youth-specific unemployment policies. Proponents of more liberal and flexible labor markets (e.g., employers) justify their demands with regard to youth unemployment. According to this position, young people are the first ones to suffer from labor market rigidities. Trade unions oppose these demands and have a rather ambivalent position in regard to youth-related policies. While they see the need for more action in regard to young job-seekers, given the dramatically high unemployment rates in some European member states, they are quite prudent in calling for youth-specific measures and initiatives because they could lead to a general relaxation of standards in the realm of wages, contracts, working conditions, and social security entitlements, thus endangering established rights of older workers and the general workforce at large. Only social NGOs promote the idea of a youth-specific policy strategy against unemployment, which stresses the need to facilitate the access of young people to the labor market while recalibrating social rights and benefits for young jobless people at the same time. However, this position is, politically speaking, not a very relevant one because social NGOs are not thoroughly involved in the employment related OMC process as the social partners are.

This constellation of actors and interests helps to explain why the European policy initiatives lack a consistent and explicit strategy to combat youth unemployment and why progress has been made only in very specific fields of action with less palpable consequences. To overcome this deadlock, member states and public interest groups should deliberate further about incentives.

*Civil society organizations are part of issue-specific consultations and deliberations, yet they need to be involved in a more generalized and structured manner*

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in representing and servicing young and disadvantaged people. Moreover, they have valuable knowledge about the social reality at the local level. When youth unemployment rates rose in reaction to the economic crisis in 2008, social NGOs were recognized as important intermediate actors within this policy field. European CSOs are consulted by EU institutions in many areas of policy-making. Apart from issue-specific consultations, the EU institutions have engaged in the development of more structured forms of dialogue with organized civil society. Above all, we can refer to the social dialogue between the EU institutions, the employers' associations and trade unions. In the field of social NGOs, a less institutionalized and structured "civil dialogue" between EU institutions and social CSOs has developed. However, in spite of initiatives by the EU Parliament to establish a more structured "civil dialogue" in 2009, no generalized consultation practices have been developed. One important exception to this picture is provided by the field of youth policies. In this area of political debate, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution in 2005 to establish a structured dialogue between EU institutions, member states, and young people and their organizations. The *European Youth Forum* is formally included in this structured dialogue as the EU institutions' primary partner. Since 2007, several rounds of debate have been launched, and there have been various consultations at the European and national levels. Since early 2010, the thematic priority has been youth employment.

Problems with regard to the involvement of CSOs arise from the fact that the structured participation of social NGOs is limited to specific fields of action. Youth organizations are part of the "structured dialogue on youth" and of the OMC on Social Inclusion but not of the Social Dialogue and the employment OMC. Some NGOs have a quasi-institutionalized access to policy deliberations while others lack this kind of status. In

these fields of action, social NGOs have to rely on informal patterns of lobbying and advocacy, for instance, by contacting members of the European institutions directly or forming coalitions with other actors (e.g., trade unions). However, the access to the process of consultation and decision-making depends on the willingness of the decision-making institutions to listen to these organizations because they are not obligated to consult social NGOs. For this reason, social CSOs demand a generalized and structured “civil dialogue,” a demand that is supported by the EU Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. Within the field of employment policies and amongst the members of the European Employment Committee, however, there are strong reservations regarding the increase of participants and consultations.

## **Conclusion**

Discussions about youth unemployment in the European Union have had a strong influence on the public perceptions and the general knowledge about the situation of young people in the labor market. In this respect, the EU institutions have played a significant role, particularly through the European Employment Strategy (EES). They set the terms in which the problem of unemployment is discussed and establish indicators to quantify and monitor employment problems of young people. Since 2005, the commission has been consistently improving our knowledge about the situation of young people in the labor market by collecting data and describing their situations. Moreover, a number of member states received country-specific recommendations, which advised them to focus on pending issues and potential solutions to unresolved problems. Recurrent issues were, for instance, the need to ease the transition from education to employment, increase the effectiveness of employment services, foster the integration of migrants, boost the quality and efficiency of education, and tackle the segmentation of labor markets. Member states are developing a series of measures, and the EU institutions have committed themselves to advancing and coordinating these reforms by developing youth-related objectives, guidelines and recommendations (e.g., Youth Pact 2005, Youth Strategy 2009, the flagship Youth on the Move 2010). However, our analysis identifies several issues that could be addressed to bring improvements.

### *Towards a youth-specific European employment strategy*

So far, the European Employment Strategy (EES) is a policy strategy oriented to combat the general problem of unemployment, albeit more specific policy targets are identified. There are good reasons for this policy option. Proponents of the current EES warn against including too many specific target groups, indicators, and measures, complaining that the EES has grown too much incrementally. In this regard, many speak for a lean, clear, and manageable strategy. Those interested in the situation of young people, however, amongst them the youth who are unemployed, criticize not having a specific strategy on youth that considers the particularly high rates of exclusion and the specific problems of this group. They disapprove of what they call a number of disjointed measures in various neighboring policy fields. Additionally, the EES and the most recent flagships (Youth on the Move and New Skills for New Jobs) provide privileges in some areas of action (i.e., education) while putting less emphasis on others (e.g., social security, stable contracts, wages, etc.).

Both positions have merit. Moreover, there is a trade-off between the parsimoniousness and consistency of a general employment strategy and the specificity and effectiveness of policies targeting young unemployed people. A way out of this dilemma could be to put more effort into the identification and coordination of target-specific policy initiatives within and across various policy fields. If youth unemployment is to be taken seriously, there needs to be at least a more coherent review and coordination process that ensures that the various priorities and measures (education, entrepreneurship, social inclusion, and anti-poverty) are integrated into a consistent policy approach. Hence, what is

needed is a coordination of the various processes (e.g., employment, social inclusion, youth OMCs) relevant to unemployment among this group. This would help to prevent the biased approach followed so far, which touts the idea of education as the primary road to salvation for youth, migrants, older workers, and women. The idea of one size fits all has a greater chance of failing. Hence, a youth-specific strategy is necessary because youth unemployment is a multidimensional problem that calls for a cross-sectional approach.

### *Improving peer learning within the Open Method of Coordination*

Our report has demonstrated that the OMC is generally appreciated by member states and has many advantages. However, weaknesses remain, which are mainly related to the voluntary nature of this process. These shortcomings have been well documented by scientific research and public debate and our interviews brought about similar findings. But what can be done? On the one hand, we might want to hope that the discussion about more European “economic governance” will enlarge the competencies of the EU in the field of employment. On the other hand, it might be necessary to think about improving the OMC and its peer learning exercise. This seems advisable. Our interviews have illustrated that there is much monitoring and bench-marking going on in regard to youth unemployment, and participants positively evaluated the flexibility and openness of the process. Paradoxically, little learning is happening. In particular, national governments prioritize the “selling” of existing policies and measures, while their knowledge about other countries' practices is very limited, if not nonexistent. If learning is happening, it seems to happen on the level of practitioners, who are less pressured to sell national policies and more interested in improving implementation. Moreover, learning is oriented towards identifying good practices, discouraging countries from speaking about problems, shortcomings, and imperfections. Finally, countries with a good standing regarding policy performance (e.g., those with low unemployment rates) tend to lean on peer learning, preventing a critical evaluation of their policies' effectiveness. The unemployed in these countries do not seem to benefit from the OMC.

We thus recommend fully exploiting the potentials of peer learning within the OMC. This can be done in different ways. First, it can mean an increase in the peer-learning exercise on the level of practitioners and less among government representatives. The proposal within the EU flagship Youth on the Move to include experts from public employment services is a first step in this direction. Second, we advocate a more proactive practice of “naming and shaming” based on a more critical and rigorous analysis of member states' political policies and measures. And finally, we advise integrating civil society organizations more actively into these exercises because they are closer to the vulnerable groups whose futures are at stake. Moreover, they are able to raise new views, insights and pieces of information. Finally, they allow putting into practice a more critical review of national policies.

### *Increasing involvement of civil society organizations*

In general, there is a broad consensus within the European Union that civil society organizations play a crucial role regarding political advocacy and social services and must be involved in consultations and policy deliberations. However, there is disagreement about the extent of their involvement. Our field work has illustrated that CSOs are integrated in some policy fields (e.g., the OMC on Social Inclusion, the structured dialogue on youth) but not in others. In particular, they are not part of employment related consultations within and around the European Employment Committee. EU institutions are not concerned with increasing their involvement at the EU level in a generalized and structured way. A recurrently named reason for this is that the social partners are already institutionally integrated. Any other involvement would make consultations inefficient. However, the advantages of a stronger involvement seems to over-compensate for this technical and organizational disadvantage. On the one hand, we have argued that CSOs have important resources to contribute, thus

helping to considerably improve the knowledge base of peer learning and the quality of policies. On the other hand, a stronger involvement would help to reduce the existing gap between the EU and the local civil society, where the EU is a marginal reference point for CSOs.